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Consolidation of the tax base in the European Union is expected to curve compliance costs and
reduce proﬁt shifting. A number of proposals for consolidation from the European Commission
are simulated with the applied general equilibrium model CORTAX. We show that the beneﬁts
from consolidation are offset by two weaknesses in the proposals for a common consolidated tax
base. Formula apportionment, which is needed to allocate the consolidated taxable proﬁts across
jurisdictions, creates new tax planning possibilities for MNEs and allows them to beneﬁt from
existing tax rate differentials in the European Union. In addition, it triggers tax competition as
member states may attract foreign investment by reducing their tax rates. The second distortion
is an unlevel playing ﬁeld, which is introduced if only part of the ﬁrms participate in the
consolidation. The gains from consolidation can be fully grasped if it is obliged for all ﬁrms and
if it is accompanied by a harmonisation of the tax rate.




Consolidatie van de belastinggrondslag in de Europese Unie zal leiden tot een verlaging van de
administratieve lasten van bedrijven en een vermindering van winstverschuiving. Een aantal
voorstellen voor consolidatie van de Europese Commissie worden gesimuleerd met het
toegepaste algemeen evenwichtsmodel CORTAX. We laten zien dat de voordelen van
consolidatie teniet gedaan worden door twee tekortkomingen in de voorstellen voor een
gemeenschappelijke geconsolideerde belastinggrondslag. De verdeelsleutel, die nodig is om de
samengevoegde grondslag te verdelen over de lidstaten, introduceert de mogelijkheden voor
multinationals om hun Vpb-belastingen te minimaliseren via verplaatsing van productie of
verkopen naar lidstaten met lage belastingtarieven. Lidstaten kunnen hierop inspelen door
tariefsverlagingen, zodat de trend tot belastingconcurrentie versterkt wordt door consolidatie van
de grondslag. De tweede verstoring is ongelijke concurrentie tussen multinationals en
binnenlandse bedrijven, die mogelijk uitgesloten worden van de grondslaghervorming. De
voordelen van consolidatie kunnen volledig worden benut als alle bedrijven overgaan op de
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Member States are free to choose the tax systems that they consider most appropriate and
according to their preferences. Yet, differences in corporate tax systems involve large costs, as it
prohibits cross-border tax relief and involve large compliance costs for multinational enterprises.
In its 2002 Tax Communication, the European Commission proposes consolidation of the
corporate tax base as a solution to these problems and a step forward in the functioning of the
Internal Market. Commissioner Kovázs (in a speech on April 5, 2006) expects that the Common
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, the most likely means of consolidation, would enhance
competitiveness, boost growth and promote the creation of jobs in the EU. With the aim of an
applied general equilibrium model of corporate taxation in the European Union, the current
paper investigates whether consolidation indeed may deliver these economic beneﬁts. Does it
justify EU involvement in corporate taxation?
This report is part of the project on “Tax/beneﬁt systems and growth potential of the EU”
(TAXBEN, Project no. SCS8-CT-2004-502639), ﬁnanced by the European Commission under
FP6 of DG Research. The authors thank Peter Sørensen for the kind provision of his OECDTAX
software, which has been of great help in developing our CORTAX model. The authors beneﬁted
from contributions and comments by Gaëtan Nicodème, Joeri Gorter, Arjan Lejour, Ruud de
Mooij and Paul Veenendaal. Discussions in response to presentations at the conference on
’Subsidiarity in Europe’, at the Dutch Ministry of Finance and at the ﬁnal conference of the
TAXBEN workshop in Brussels, in particular by Michel Aujean, director for Analysis and Tax




Companies operating across the internal market are hampered by tax obstacles such as high
compliance costs for cross-border operations, transfer pricing and the lack of cross-border loss
compensation. These obstacles are inherent in the current system of separate accounting (SA),
where the corporate income of foreign subsidiaries of multinational enterprises is treated
separately for tax purposes. In its 2002 Tax Communication, the European Commission
proposed consolidation of the tax base as an answer to the inherent difﬁculties of separate
accounting and the large compliance costs. The consolidated base has to be apportioned to the
member states to guarantee their ability to tax corporate income.
The aim of consolidation is to improve competitiveness in the European Union. Yet, the
economic effects of consolidation with formula apportionment are hardly known. This study
performs a numerical assessment of the economic effects using the computable general
equilibrium model CORTAX. This model is designed to investigate corporate tax base
consolidation in the European Union. The model captures the main features of corporate income
taxation in 17 EU member states and the United States. It includes the investment and
labour-demand decisions of both multinational enterprises (MNEs) and domestic ﬁrms.
Moreover, the model allows for a welfare analysis by considering the optimal response of
households to changes in taxes and factor rewards. This welfare analysis answers questions on
the efﬁciency of the corporate income tax system in the European Union and on the distribution
of the gains and losses of consolidation.
In a recent communication, the European Commission (2006) reemphasises the need for
consolidation and proposes to proceed along the lines of the Common Consolidated Base
Taxation (CCBT). This proposal reduces the compliance costs for internationally operating
enterprises. In addition, shifting paper proﬁts across jurisdictions becomes meaningless if the tax
base is consolidated. Unfortunately, the CCBT not only delivers these gains, but also contains
two distortive elements. First, formula apportionment, which is needed to allocate the
consolidated taxable proﬁts across jurisdictions, creates new tax planning possibilities for
MNEs. Second, an unlevel playing ﬁeld is introduced if only part of the ﬁrms participate in the
consolidation.
Formula apportionment creates new tax planning possibilities for MNEs. Tax planning is the
ability of ﬁrms to minimise their tax obligations by shifting proﬁts or economic activity across
jurisdictions. Transfer pricing, the most common means of tax planning in the current system of
separate accounting, will become meaningless with the consolidation of the tax base. However,
with formula apportionment, the share of the tax base apportioned to each jurisdiction can be
inﬂuenced by shifting economic activity from one jurisdiction to another. Even though real
9economic activity, like production or FDI, can be shifted less easily than paper proﬁts to other
member states, its economic impact is larger. The change in the tax planning strategy of MNEs,
by reallocation instead of transfer pricing, therefore reduces welfare in the EU.
The second distortion is introduced if the common tax base is optional or if not all ﬁrms are
allowed to participate. It results in a different treatment of MNEs and domestic ﬁrms, if the latter
are excluded from the common base and still have to apply to the base of their home country.
This creates an unlevel playing ﬁeld between ﬁrms and leads to a reduction of GDP, employment
and welfare.
Europe hardly beneﬁts on average from the common consolidated base taxation. The gains
from a reduction in compliance costs and the elimination of transfer pricing are offset by the
efﬁciency losses from reallocation. Corporate tax revenues decline on average by about 2% due
to the expansion of ﬁrms in member states with low tax rates and/or narrow tax bases.
Alternative means of ﬁnancing have to be found in order to balance the government budget. The
resulting gains in GDP and welfare are small, respectively 0.05% and 0.01% of GDP, which
shows that the distortions introduced by the CCBT offset the gains from consolidation.
Some member states gain, where others lose, from the consolidation and apportionment of
the tax base. First, multinationals in most member states gain from consolidation and from the
alternative route for tax planning. This gives them a competitive advantage over domestic ﬁrms,
which do not beneﬁt from tax base consolidation. Second, governments in countries with a
broad tax base lose from consolidation if the common tax base is deﬁned at the current EU
average. A broader deﬁnition of the tax base generates more corporate tax revenues, but distorts
investments. Third, welfare improves in member states with large shares of multinational
enterprises, below-average tax rates and/or broader-than-average tax bases. A low tax rate
matters, because it makes member states relatively attractive for multinationals. A broad tax
base matters, because the common base is less distortive. And the openness of countries matter,
because these countries are most sensitive to corporate tax reforms.
Consolidation intensiﬁes competition in tax rates, which reﬂects the beneﬁts from having a
low tax rate. The switch by multinationals from favourable proﬁt shifting (under separate
accounting) to attracting production (with formula apportionment) implies that the gains from
unilateral reductions in the tax rate increase. Simulations show that consolidation implies an
optimal reduction in tax rates by individual member states of 10 to 20 percentage points.
One of the disadvantages of CCBT, namely the uneven treatment of multinational and domestic
enterprises is obviated in the alternative EC-proposal of Home State Taxation (HST). In this
proposal, domestic ﬁrms and multinational headquarters are treated equally, as they all have to
apply to the tax rules of the member state in which they operate. However, unevenness is now
created between subsidiaries from different home countries, which again offsets the initial gains
from consolidation. The EU on average hardly gains nor loses from HST: welfare is unchanged
and GDP declines slightly.
10The second disadvantage of CCBT depends on the design of the apportionment formula, but
cannot be fully overcome by a proper design. The largest distortions are introduced if
apportionment is based on a single production factor, e.g. on employment or on capital. The
incentives for reallocation are minimised if the apportionment formula resembles the distribution
of corporate income of MNEs and is based on activities which cannot easily be affected by ﬁrms.
However, even in this best case, formula apportionment generates an efﬁciency loss for the
European Union.
The reason why formula apportionment and its design matters a lot, is the large differences in
tax rates in the European Union. These tax differentials trigger tax planning, by reallocation of
production or sales to low-tax countries. This tax planning can be tempered, but not eliminated
by a proper choice of the apportionment formula. Only the harmonisation of tax rates can undo
the incentives for reallocation.
The gains from consolidation can only be fully grasped if it is obliged for all ﬁrms and if it is
accompanied by a harmonisation of the tax rate. In this far-reaching scenario, known as the
European Union Corporate Income Tax, a welfare gain between 0.1% and 0.2% of GDP can be
obtained.
11121 Introduction
Companies operating across the internal market are hampered by tax obstacles such as high
compliance costs for cross-border operations, transfer pricing and the lack of cross-border loss
compensation. These obstacles are inherent in the current system of separate accounting (SA),
where the corporate income of foreign subsidiaries of multinational enterprises is treated
separately for tax purposes. Although SA has been applied in the European Union since decades,
changing circumstances have questioned its desirability and practical viability. Indeed, SA was
appropriate when most European businesses operated at a national level and when cross-border
multinational transactions involved primarily tangible goods. However, increased EU economic
integration through the Single Market stimulated many European companies to operate at the EU
level. Moreover, the nature of cross-border multinational transactions has changed dramatically.
It is ever more frequent that intra-ﬁrm transfers involve intangible goods (e.g. copyrights,
patents) which are very difﬁcult to price (Martens-Weiner, 2006).
On the one hand, this context has left tax authorities with signiﬁcant difﬁculties to apply the
separate-entity taxation and the arm’s length principle. On the other hand, multinational
enterprises (MNEs) have more ease to apply transfer pricing and other proﬁt shifting techniques
in order to reduce their tax payments. As a response to these developments, tax authorities have
increased the documentation requirements and penalties to curve MNE proﬁt shifting, which
results in high compliance costs for EU companies (European Commission, 2004a).
The European Commission (2002) proposed consolidation of the tax base as an answer to the
inherent difﬁculties of separate accounting and the large compliance costs. Indeed, proﬁt shifting
will be meaningless and compliance costs will be reduced substantially if tax bases are
consolidated. In addition, consolidation will facilitate loss-compensation across jurisdictions
(Nicodème, 2006).
Harmonisation of the tax rate is considered to be a bridge too far, as it would overrule the
primacy of members states in corporate tax policy. As a solution, member states are allowed to
tax a fraction of the consolidated base at their own rate. This requires the apportioning of the
consolidated base to the member states, presumably with some kind of apportionment formula.
Formula apportionment (FA) is a way to distribute the tax base between the member states.
Some measure of economic activity is used to determine which fraction of the consolidated base
is generated in each jurisdiction and may therefore be taxed by each tax authority. Among the
potential advantages of formula apportionment is that it reduces the ability of MNEs to apply tax
planning strategies, i.e. the ability of ﬁrms to minimise their tax obligations by shifting proﬁts or
economic activity across jurisdictions (Martens-Weiner, 2006; Sørensen, 2004). Transfer pricing
is the tax planning strategy most commonly applied in the current system of separate accounting,
but will become meaningless with the consolidation of the tax base. However, formula
13apportionment opens up new tax planning possibilities for MNEs, as the apportioned share of the
tax base to each jurisdiction can be inﬂuenced by shifting economic activity from one
jurisdiction to another. By increasing the share of proﬁts in low-tax member states, ﬁrms may
minimise their tax payments.
The aim of consolidation is to improve competitiveness in the European Union. Yet, the
economic effects of consolidation with formula apportionment are hardly known. We can learn
from the existing systems in the United States and Canada (Martens-Weiner, 2006). However,
economic effects likely depend on both the kind of consolidation and of the economic structure
in the EU. For example, tax rate differentials are much larger in the EU, which might have
important implications for the economic and welfare effects of formula apportionment.
Additional insights into consolidation and formula apportionment can be gained by theorising on
the responses of ﬁrms and the implications for government revenues (Mintz and Weiner, 2003;
Nielsen et al., 2006). Still, an integrated framework is needed, allowing for numerical
assessments of the economic outcomes of consolidation with formula apportionment in
comparison with the current SA system (Devereux, 2004; Gérard, 2002).
This paper applies such an integrated framework, namely the computable general
equilibrium model CORTAX, to consolidation in the European Union. The model is designed to
investigate these issues, by including consolidation and formula apportionment in a model which
is otherwise extensively based on the model by Sørensen (2004). CORTAX is therefore the ﬁrst
CGE model applied to consolidation and formula apportionment in Europe (see Edmiston
(2002) for an application to the United States). With this model, we investigate the economic
and welfare effects of reforming the corporate income tax base in the European Union.
Does consolidation improve the economic efﬁciency in the European Union by reducing
corporate tax distortions? This central question will be supplemented with several others. Does
it contribute to employment and GDP? How are the gains and losses distributed within member
states, between say domestic ﬁrms and multinationals, and between ﬁrms and households?
Finally, consolidation opens up the opportunity for governments to attract foreign investments
by cutting tax rates; does consolidation trigger tax competition?
The answers to these questions depend on the type of consolidation and the details of the
apportionment formula. We investigate the following alternatives.
The ﬁrst choice is about the scope and design of consolidation (see section 3 for a detailed
discussion of these proposals). Four alternative types of consolidation have been put forward by
the European Commission in its 2002 Tax Communication (European Commission, 2002).
Currently, the European Commission (2006) seems to favour the option with a common
consolidated tax base, to which multinational enterprises may choose to switch. A practical
alternative, which does not require the introduction of a common tax base, is home state
14taxation, where each enterprise may consolidate its taxable proﬁts according to the rules of its
home state. In more far-reaching proposals, consolidation is made compulsory and the common
base is applied to domestic ﬁrms too.
The second crucial choice is about the apportionment formula, which is needed to allocate
proﬁts across jurisdictions. However, formula apportionment opens up new tax planning
possibilities for MNEs. Moreover, it might induce strategic behaviour by governments to attract
FDI by cutting tax rates (and thus intensifying tax competition) or by affecting the weights in the
apportionment formula. Whether or not the European Union should allow for competition in
factor weights is an unresolved issue. However, the economic literature has shown that the
ability of each jurisdiction to change and strategically determine its factor weights, has in
general, negative welfare implications (see section 2.2). For this reason, we investigate the more
transparent uniform system, but allow for competition in tax rates.
The relevance of apportionment is acknowledged by the European Commission (2006), but
its implementation is left open. In the paper we therefore investigate several alternatives, without
pretending to be exhaustive.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains a survey from the theoretical and
empirical literature on the pros and cons of formula apportionment. Section 3 summarises the
proposals for consolidation by the European Commission, and surveys the commentaries on the
2002 Tax Communication. Section 4 introduces the CORTAX-model and describes in particular
how we implement consolidation, formula apportionment and compliance costs in this model.
We then turn to the numerical assessment of consolidation and formula apportionment.
Section 5 investigates the switch from the current system of separate accounting to consolidation
according to the rules of common consolidated base taxation (CCBT). Section 6 discusses the
consequences of the choice of the apportionment formula, within this CCBT-framework. Section
7 turns to the question whether consolidation will intensify competition in tax rates. Section 8
investigates two alternative EC-proposals, namely home state taxation (HST) and European
Union Company Taxation (EUCT). Section 9 summarises our main ﬁndings.
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The current system of corporate taxation in the European Union is known as separate
accounting, where multinational enterprises (MNE) have to ﬁle the tax return in every member
state separately. Two elements of this system are seen to be detrimental for the well functioning
of the internal market. First, the cross-border activities of MNEs have to be valued in order to
determine the taxable proﬁts of each MNE in all member states. This valuation allows for tax
planning strategies, as MNEs may set high (low) transfer prices for cross-border deliveries
towards high-tax (low-tax) countries. Second, the multiple ﬁling involves high compliance costs.
Consolidation of the tax base solves both problems as it adds up all the taxable proﬁts of the
MNE (within the EU) into a single base. In the existing consolidated systems of the United
States and Canada, and in the proposed system of the European Commission (see section 3, in
particular the CCTB-proposal), the consolidated base is apportioned, via some well-deﬁned
formula, towards each jurisdiction. In the EU, this would allow the member states to tax their
part of the corporate tax base at their own tax rate.1
In the literature that deals with formula apportionment (FA), two topics have received most
of the theoretical and empirical analysis: the tax planning strategies employed by MNEs and the
strategic decisions to deﬁne the apportionment formula by governments. We discuss both issues
in turn, and present the available empirical evidence related to the implementation of FA in the
US and Canada.
2.1 Tax planning strategies by MNEs
When the corporate income tax (CIT) is not fully harmonised between different jurisdictions (i.e.
the tax rates are not equal and/or the tax base is not fully consolidated), MNEs have incentives to
apply tax planning strategies. The objective of these strategies is to reduce the total CIT payment
of the MNE.
A central concern for tax authorities is the increased difﬁculty to measure transfer pricing
using the arm’s length principle.2 These difﬁculties have increased the scope for tax planning
activities by MNEs which is an important distortion under SA. It is expected that tax base
consolidation will eliminate the possibility of MNEs to shift proﬁts using transfer pricing
mechanisms.
1 Consolidation and formula apportionment are more precisely deﬁned in the box on page 18, which also includes the
applications in the US and Canada.
2 Arm’s length pricing means that taxable income of a corporation’s activity in each jurisdiction is based on computing the
value of transactions between related afﬁliates as if they had occurred by independent parties in the market place (Kind
et al., 2005).
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Consolidation is the central theme in the EC proposals. It means that similar rules and criteria are implemented to estimate
corporate proﬁts between jurisdictions and to obtain the consolidated proﬁts of the MNE.
These consolidated proﬁts might be apportioned to the member states according to well-deﬁned rules. Formally, if these
consolidated proﬁts are given by π, then the tax revenue of each jurisdiction j can be expressed by:
TRj = τjφjπ (2.1)
where τj is the statutory corporate tax rate applied in j and φj is the apportionment share of jurisdiction j; i.e. the share
of the total corporate tax base assigned to j. The central idea of FA is that φj reﬂects the share of corporate income
generated by the MNE in each jurisdiction.
The next step is to estimate the share φ of corporate income by relating it to measurable factors related to the input (labour,
capital) or output (sales) of corporate activity. In principle, several formulae can be designed using different combinations
of apportionment factors and their respective weights. In practice, there are four countries (i.e. USA, Canada, Switzerland
and Germany) that currently apply some kind of FA in their tax system.a
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The apportionment formula in the US is extended in two ways. First, it includes a third factor capital (K). In addition, each
state (j) can independently choose the weights (f S
j , f L
j , f K
j ) they use for each factor. Thus, the apportionment formula is
given by:
φUS



















j + f P
j + f K
j = 1 (2.3)
a Mintz and Weiner (2003) present a short summary of the FA systems used for each of these countries. However, by far the US and
Canadian system have been the most researched. Weiner (1999) presents an in-depth description of the US system, while Mintz and
Smart (2004) describe the Canadian system.
Transfer pricing, however, is not the only instrument used by MNEs to reduce tax payments.
Gérard (2002, 2006) moves beyond the issue of transfer pricing and incorporates in his analysis
these other tax planning strategies. Gérard (2006) classiﬁes all the tax planning strategies into
three main groups:
1. Allocation and investment decisions.
2. Transfer pricing.
3. Financial detour strategies.
All these strategies could be used by MNEs if either tax rates or tax bases are not fully
harmonised between participating jurisdictions. Moreover, they create distortions of there own
on the type of ﬁnance, the legal organization, and the location of parents and subsidiaries. Thus,
Gérard (2006) argues that only a perfectly integrated tax system can eliminate these distortions.
For both the SA and FA system, this is fully achieved only with both tax rate and tax base
18harmonization. In this scenario, however, FA is a superior system since it implies a reduction in
compliance costs and the possibility of loss compensations between subsidiaries of the same
MNE.
We proceed to review the literature that deals with each of these tax planning strategies.
2.1.1 Allocation and investment decisions
When the apportionment formula is not homogenous and/or CIT rates differ among
jurisdictions, the CIT can be traduced as excise taxes on the speciﬁc factors included in the
formula, see box on excise taxes. This implies, for example, that if apportionment is (partly)
based on payroll, then the labour demand by MNEs is distorted by differences in the corporate
income tax between jurisdictions.
Econometric studies for the United States and Canada, surveyed by Edmiston (2002), reveal
that changes in the factor weights signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the demand or supply of that factor.
Moreover, he shows that the magnitude and sign of the effect depends on the size, industrial
make-up, and levels of statutory tax rates in each jurisdiction. In particular, differences in tax
rates between jurisdictions will determine the impact of the factor weights in the apportionment
formula on allocation and investment. In the following, we repeatedly return to this factor
reallocation as a tax planning device.
Already in the current system of separate accounting, the corporate income tax inﬂuences the
allocation and investment decisions of MNEs. In a review of the literature, De Mooij and
Ederveen (2003) ﬁnd substantial differences in the empirical methods and data employed by
different studies. Thus, they perform a meta analysis to estimate the semi-elasticity of FDI to the
CIT rate, and report a value of −2.4 when the average corporate tax rate is used. If the statutory
rate is used instead, the value is reduced to −1.2. When FDI data is adjusted to exclude mergers
and acquisitions, the elasticities remain high, and increase to −5.7 when only new plants and
plant expansions are used instead of total FDI. Therefore, it is clear that CIT policies matter
greatly for investment and allocation decisions.
Since differences in CIT rates play such an important role in MNE investment, it is useful to
look at tax rate differentials between jurisdictions. Based on the methodology presented by
Devereux and Grifﬁth (1999), the European Commission (2002) ﬁnds high CIT rate differentials
within the EU15. These results are reinforced by Devereux et al. (2004) and Jacobs et al. (2005)
who ﬁnd a large dispersion on the effective tax burdens in the expanded EU25. These signiﬁcant
tax differentials suggest an important potential for production reallocation between member
states. Thus, the use of different tax planning strategies by MNEs within the EU can be
signiﬁcant and must be considered while modelling the behaviour of MNEs. In an analytical
framework, this is specially true when long-term scenarios are considered, and production
factors can reallocate easier.
CIT rate differentials within the US are much smaller than in the EU. The tax differential
between the highest and lowest statutory CIT rate in US states is about 8 percentage points,
19Excise tax with formula apportionment
The early literature (McLure, 1980; Gordon and Wilson, 1986) already identiﬁed the main tax distortions created by FA.
Indeed, when the apportionment factors, their weights and/or the CIT rates differ over the different jurisdictions, then the
FA can be traduced as excise taxes on the factors weighted in the formula. For example, the excise tax on labour τL
π can





















The ﬁrst equation shows that the excise tax raises the wage costs by ﬁrms (a subsidy will reduce it) by affecting the equality
between the marginal productivity of labour, MPL, and the wage rate, w. The second equation relates the excise tax to
the deviation of the statutory CIT-rate in the home country or state τπ(i) to the weighted average of the statutory rate in
all countries or states where the MNE is active. This tax gap is weighted with the relative size of consolidated proﬁts π to
payroll P and the weight on payroll f P. Similar excise taxes can be derived for other apportionment factors.
From these equations, it is clear that the excise taxes (subsidies) in a country or state arise from deviations from the
statutory rate from the factor-weighted national average. Only in the case of uniform tax rates and equal apportionment
weights (as in Canada) will the factor-speciﬁc excise taxes disappear. When this tax rate harmonization is reached, then
the FA system will resemble a corporate tax levied at the national level.
In general, these factor-speciﬁc distortions create complicated incentive effects for both the MNEs and governments alike.
MNEs have incentives to change location and their factor allocation (see section 2.1), while a government has incentives
to adjust the weights of the apportionment factors and this in turn, creates strategic interactions with other tax authorities
(see section 2.2). However, even when the factor weights are ﬁxed, Mintz (1999) also points out that ﬁscal externalities
will persist when member states can levy different tax rates, credits or surtaxes.
while it is about 30 percentage points in the EU25. These ﬁgures indicate that the tax rate
differential and levels are signiﬁcantly different between both regions and tax rate competition is
expected to be a more critical issue for the CIT tax reforms of the EU.
2.1.2 Transfer pricing
If there is tax base consolidation and it is compulsory for all MNEs, it is commonly assumed that
switching to FA will eliminate the possibility of MNEs to use transfer pricing as a tax planning
device. However, to reach this conclusion one has to assume as well, that there is perfect
competition in the industries where MNEs operate. Otherwise, Nielsen et al. (2003) and Kind
et al. (2005) argue that under conditions of imperfect (oligopolistic) competition, a transition
from separate accounting (SA) to formula apportionment (FA) does not eliminate the problem of
transfer pricing. In their models it is assumed that transfer pricing is also a strategic device in a
Cournot competition setting. In this context, MNEs have incentives to use transfer pricing
strategies to improve their competitiveness against rival ﬁrms. Therefore, while FA eliminates
the proﬁt shifting incentives of transfer pricing, it does not eliminate the strategic competition
ones, and the transfer pricing distortions are kept in place.
20Both papers do not consider production reallocation or other tax planning strategies. Thus, their
models miss much of the interactions between CIT and MNE decisions. Therefore, although
they present interesting modelling features for transfer pricing, their analytical framework can
only partially evaluate the welfare implications of moving from a SA system to a FA system.
Nielsen et al. (2006) construct a model where, besides the transfer pricing mechanism, MNE
headquarters also share a common input with their subsidiaries. Thus, the interaction between
transfer pricing costs and CIT rates affects both the input levels of the MNEs and the ﬁscal
spillovers between countries. Under these assumptions, their model shows that a move from SA
to FA will not clearly decrease tax distortions nor the ﬁscal spillovers associated with transfer
pricing under SA. In some cases, moreover, the switch to an apportionment formula may even
increase the CIT distortions.
Under SA, the interaction between proﬁt shifting and the MNE location is explored in two
papers. Mintz and Smart (2004) point out that if the government values both the tax revenues
and the real investment of MNEs, then proﬁt shifting may have ambiguous effects on welfare. If
there are more possibilities to shift proﬁts between jurisdictions, then MNEs have less incentives
to reallocate production. The other paper is by Peralta et al. (2006). They use a ﬁscal
competition model where the government has two instruments: the CIT rate and the tightness in
the control of proﬁt shifting. In this case, tougher transfer pricing rules can be costly for
governments, since MNE can respond by delocalising. Thus, some governments ﬁnd it attractive
to have high CIT rates but lose proﬁt shifting controls.
These papers illustrate that the evaluation of how transfer pricing changes with FA or SA is
not enough to provide a complete welfare analysis. The inclusion of production or factor
reallocation decisions by MNEs is also needed.
2.1.3 Financial detour strategies
If consolidating proﬁts between different jurisdictions is not compulsory for MNEs, then they
can also use ﬁnancial detour strategies to reduce tax payments. This third tax planning strategy
by MNEs consists of establishing an “administrative subsidiary” as a ﬁnancial centre in a
third-party country where proﬁts are not consolidated. This subsidiary, which is usually not
directly related to production or sales activities, can be used by the MNE to manipulate and
devise complex ﬁnancial operations involving dividends and interest payments, capital gains and
the transfer of business income between different subsidiaries.
When this third strategy is incorporated into the analysis, a better picture of the strategic
interactions between CIT and MNE can be obtained. Gérard (2006) uses a multi-stage model to
include the three tax planning strategies mentioned before, plus the strategic decisions of
governments that maximise welfare. To illustrate his model, he uses a numerical case study,
which is later complemented with an analytical model. An important feature of this paper, is that
it distinguishes between “paper proﬁts” and “real proﬁts”. In this way he decomposes the MNEs
21decisions in two steps. In a ﬁrst step MNEs make decisions to maximise proﬁts by choosing
production and distribution locations. In a second step, other tax planning strategies are
employed to minimise their tax payments.
In this more complex, but realistic setting, the welfare implications of moving from FA to SA
are conditional on several elements:
• the ease on which the ﬁrm can manipulate the chosen formula factors.3
• the integration of the consolidated FA system with the rest of the world.
• if the consolidation is made compulsory or not.
Since the EC proposals will most probably not be compulsory, this means that third country
detour strategies within the EU will remain a signiﬁcant source of CIT distortions.
2.2 The design of the apportionment formula by governments
The decision to apply a speciﬁc apportionment formula is non-trivial. As a result of the implicit
excise taxes on the apportionment factors, tax authorities have incentives to strategically choose
these factors and their respective weights. As shown below, the ability of each jurisdiction to
change and strategically determine its factor weights, has in general, negative welfare
implications.
Based on most of the theoretical models and the empirical results presented above, it is clear
that jurisdictions have incentives to unilaterally change their factor weights in order to increase
production, investment and/or employment levels. This result has been conﬁrmed by Omer and
Shelley (2004) who ﬁnd that in the US there is substantial interstate competition to attract ﬁrms
that operate on a national level.
In the US these strategic interactions have developed into a tendency, beginning in about
1980, to place higher weights on the sales factor. Following the insights of Gordon and Wilson
(1986), reducing the weights on payroll and property will reduce production costs in that
jurisdiction and induce MNEs to reallocate production there.4 This mechanism is referred to as
the “economic development” incentive of CIT, since reallocation implies increased employment
and capital inﬂows. This effect is conﬁrmed by the empirical review of Edmiston (2002), who
reports evidence of a moderate positive production increase associated with changes in the factor
weights. Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) present strong empirical results that conﬁrm the
externalities associated with strategic FA. They also point that changes in the factor weights by
single States have signiﬁcant externalities on other States.
This empirical evidence conﬁrms the results of some game theoretical papers. For example,
3 This includes the mobility of MNE activities between jurisdictions.
4 Implicit to this reasoning, is the fact that administratively, sales are taken at their destination, and not at their origin as
will be preferred.
22Anand and Sansing (2000) deal with the incentives of governments to change weights and the
related game theoretical issues. They show that a harmonised apportionment rule will be the
cooperative solution, but jurisdictions have strong incentives to deviate from this solution. This
creates a typical prisoner’s dilemma situation. Thus, social welfare will be higher when a
common formula is employed.
A second issue is whether apportionment should be based on mobile or immobile factors. Two
papers shed some light on this issue. Wellisch (2004) demonstrates that when using two
apportionment factors, one immobile (labour) and the other mobile (capital), it will be optimal
for the government to allocate all the weight to the immobile factor. In this case, the CIT tax is
transformed into a labour tax that reduces wages and there will be no incentives for tax
competition between jurisdictions. However, usually the mobility of the apportionment factors is
not so clear cut, and he does not consider the case where MNEs can reallocate production to take
advantage of factor price differentials.
A related but analytically more complex model is presented by Pethig and Wagener (2003).
They analyse how the use of different apportionment formulae affects tax rate competition. In
their model different formulae interact with the degree of factor mobility and the properties of
the production function. They also ﬁnd that allocating higher weights to immobile factors is
optimal for tax authorities.
2.3 Empirical evidence
We group the main empirical papers into two broad questions:
1. Do variations in the apportionment formula affect investment and employment decisions by
MNEs?
2. Do ﬁrms use tax planning strategies and shift factors to take advantage of tax differentials under
FA?
The ﬁrst question implicitly assumes a combination of different factor weights and CIT rates
between jurisdictions. This set of studies analyses the US experience. On the other hand, the
second question analyses tax differentials only when the factor weights are ﬁxed, which is the
Canadian FA system. In any case, the empirical evidence points to a positive answer to both
questions.
2.3.1 FA and factor reallocation in the US
Weiner (1994) ﬁnds no statistical inﬂuence on production decisions from the cross-state
variation in the formulae used by the States in 1977. However, when she analyses the changes in
the States’ CIT rates and property factor weights between 1982 and 1990, she ﬁnds a statistically
signiﬁcant effect on investment spending by State, but the effects are not very large.
23Klassen and Shackelford (1998) report a signiﬁcant negative relation between the sales excise
rate (i.e. CIT statutory rate times the sales factor weight) and the location of MNE activities.
Gupta and Hofmann (2003) ﬁnd an elasticity in the range of −0.18 to −0.35, for new capital
expenditures with respect to the capital excise rate.
Moreover, Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) present strong empirical evidence supporting that
the apportionment formula affects MNEs decisions. In particular, they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant reaction
of state employment to changes in the payroll weights. A reduction in the payroll weight from
1/3 to 1/4 increases employment by around 1.1%.
2.3.2 FA and factor reallocation in Canada
The Canadian experience, where all Provinces use a formula with common and ﬁxed factor
weights,5 shows that MNEs still use tax planning strategies to exploit differences in the CIT
rates between Provinces. The empirical results by Mintz and Smart (2004), using administrative
tax data for Canada, ﬁnd that the elasticity of taxable income to tax rates is signiﬁcantly higher
for ﬁrms able to engage in proﬁt-shifting strategies (4.9) than for other comparable ﬁrms (2.3).
Likewise, Weiner (1994) concludes that tax rate competition is highly effective in Canada.
Using panel data from 1962 to 1989 she ﬁnds that reductions in CIT rates are strongly associated
with increases in provincial investment. Moreover, Klassen and Shackelford (1998) ﬁnd
evidence for both the US and Canada consistent with corporations shifting their tax bases to
tax-favourable jurisdictions.
Tax rate competition affects investment in both SA and FA. However, the incentive to
re-adjust property shares under FA creates a second effect that is not present with SA. Thus, the
standard point of view is that FA increases tax competition between jurisdictions. This view is
supported by the models of Gordon and Wilson (1986) and Nielsen et al. (2006). On the other
hand, Sørensen (2004) argues that this “secondary” effect under FA is not assured and under
some circumstances is not present. For example, Wellisch (2004) points that it does not exist at
all in the Canadian formula where there is no property factor.
If all countries applied the same formula, Pethig and Wagener (2003) argue that tax rate
competition will generally be stronger if there is a higher weight on the payroll factor, since
labour is assumed to be the least mobile factor, compared to property and sales. Finally, Kolmar
and Wagener (2004) point that tax rate competition is independent of the tax base under SA, but
both the tax base and the formula simultaneously affect tax rate competition under FA.
An important result found by Mintz and Smart (2004) is that since it is not compulsory for
Canadian ﬁrms to consolidate their accounts, many ﬁrms use this loophole to engage in tax
planning strategies also employed under a SA system.
5 See box on consolidation and formula apportionment.
242.3.3 Corporate tax analysis in CGE models
Edmiston (2002) builds a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to evaluate the strategic
formula apportionment policies in the US. The model was aggregated to eight regions and eight
industrial sectors and was calibrated to data from the 1992 US economy. To obtain a short run
and a long run scenario, he models the production aggregation function using a CES formulation
that includes an elasticity of substitution in the location of production. Since there is a limit to
production reallocation, Edminston chooses a higher elasticity for the long run speciﬁcation
(5.0) and assumes that labour is mobile. For the short-run version of the model, labour is
geographically immobile and the location elasticity is close to zero (0.3).
Edmiston (2002) applies this CGE model to compare the long-run economic equilibrium
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. Moreover, to assess the strategic gains for each state, he ﬁrst simulates
the case where each region independently moves to f S
h = 1, and then, when all regions
simultaneously move in this direction.
He ﬁnds support for the economic development effects of strategic weight determination by
US regions. In his simulations, when regions act independently and switch from an equal-weight
three-factor formula to a single-factor sales formula, net capital inﬂows, employment and
production all increase. In the long run, the percentage change in capital, labour and output is
positive for each region, with the average increase being around 1%.
These impacts, however, are conditional on differences in industrial structure, the CIT
statutory rates and the size of the US region. Hence, the output increases in a range from 1.4% to
0.2%. In general, small regions with a relatively capital-mobile industrial base and high statutory
tax rates gain the most from the move to a single-factor sales formula.
In the case of a simultaneous move of all regions to a single-factor sales formula, there are
both winners and losers. However, once a region moves towards a single-factor sales formula, all
other regions have an incentive to move in the same direction. This results conﬁrms the
prisoner’s dilemma situation mentioned before.
The magnitude of the economic development gains is much lower in the short run, when
labour is immobile. Finally, his simulations show that the revenue impacts are signiﬁcantly
bigger than the economic development gains, especially in the short run.
Although not designed to explicitly deal with FA, Sørensen (2001, 2004) constructs a CGE
model of tax competition and coordination: OECDTAX. This model includes proﬁt shifting via
transfer pricing assuming SA. Sørensen (2004) estimates the welfare gains from a complete CIT
rate and base harmonization in the EU.6 He does not consider the consolidation of the tax base,
6 In a recent paper, Sørensen and co-authors (Brøchner et al., 2006) extend the analysis by simulating enhanced
cooperation, where only the tax base and rate are harmonised in the euro-area, which sizes down the gains from tax
harmonisation.
25and therefore does not have to introduce formula apportionment in the model. The welfare gains
of harmonisation are just between 0.1 and 0.2%,7 where the majority of member states beneﬁts,
but some will lose. Since Sørensen does not consider welfare gains from lower compliance
costs, he concludes that only if these costs are signiﬁcantly reduced, it will be attractive for
Member States to seek tax harmonization and give up sovereignty on corporate taxation.
Devereux (2004) also highlights the crucial role that reducing compliance costs can play
when assessing the welfare implications of switching to FA. In addition, he discusses the
intrinsic problems of analysing equity and efﬁciency issues in CGE models. He argues that the
equity issues are too complicated to analyse and estimate, and thus, should not be taking into
account when designing international taxes.
We summarise this section with two concluding remarks. First, the literature emphasises that
within a FA system, there still exist tax planning strategies that can be employed by the
multinationals. Thus, the distortions associated with these tax planning strategies are still
present; unless the shift to FA also includes a compulsory harmonisation of the tax rate and the
tax base. As a consequence, there is the possibility that the overall distortions associated with the
CIT are greater under FA, than with SA.
Secondly, the design of the speciﬁc apportionment formula is crucial for the economic
performance of the system. This is a direct consequence of the strategic incentives that
governments have to change the formula, combined with the potential distortions induced by
proﬁt shifting strategies under FA. Although there is no ideal FA system, the evidence suggests
that the option where jurisdictions can independently determine their factor weights should be
avoided. Another recommendation is that the factors should be chosen to limit the proﬁt shifting
allocation decisions of MNEs. However, there are no clear candidates that can fully achieve this
goal.
7 Similar welfare gains are simulated in Copenhagen Economics (2004) with CETAX, which is a slightly adjusted version
of OECDTAX. A somewhat larger welfare gain of 0.4%GDP is obtained in a simulation with harmonisation at the
equal-weighted rate and base. This unweighted average, however, implies a signiﬁcant reduction in the CIT-revenues,
which reduces the average distortiveness of the CIT.
263 The 2002 Tax Communication
In the 2002 Tax Communication,8 the European Commission presents an overview of the current
state of the corporate income tax (CIT) system in the EU and proposes several changes to the
current system. We describe the main issues included in this report and the reactions it generated
in the economic literature.
The European Commission (2002) points to three main reasons for consolidating the tax base
for MNEs within the EU.
• Increase economic efﬁciency, by improving the allocation of capital within the Internal Market.
This also entails the ease of cross-border mergers and multinational activities. However, the aim
is to balance the trade-off between tax neutrality and other welfare considerations (i.e. equity
preferences and the provision of public goods).
• Reduce the compliance costs associated with the existence of 25 separate tax systems in the EU.
• Eliminate the transfer price problem. The difﬁculties to apply the arm’s length principle have
increased the compliance costs for tax authorities and businesses alike; while it facilitates the use
of tax planning strategies by MNEs.
The European Commission considers that a comprehensive approach, which provides a single
common consolidated tax base for MNEs, is the best way to deal with these problems. Within
this comprehensive approach, four alternative schemes are proposed:
1. Home State Taxation (HST): the tax base would be computed in accordance with the tax code of
the company’s home state (i.e. where the headquarter is based). This system will be optional for
MNEs and the CIT rates will still be determined by each Member State.
2. Common Consolidated Base Taxation (CCBT): this will create new harmonised EU rules for the
determination of a single tax base on an European level. It will also be optional and
country-speciﬁc CIT rates are applied.9
3. Compulsory Harmonised Corporate Tax Base (CHCTB): a single compulsory EU company tax
base and system, as a replacement for existing national systems. This system will be mandatory
for all companies, domestic as well as international. However, Member States will still
determine the CIT rates.10
4. European Union Corporate Income Tax (EUCIT): the CIT will be levied at the European level
using a new EU tax base and single tax rate. Part or all of the revenue could go directly to the
EU. The system will be compulsory, but only for MNEs.
8 European Commission (2002). This document is also referred to as the Bolkestein Report.
9 In a later communication, the European Commission (2006) refers to this proposal as the Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).
10 This option is also known as the compulsory CCCTB.
27The ﬁrst three approaches will implement formula apportionment (FA), while it could also be
used in the last one. These proposals, in any case, are not strictly deﬁned and some adjustments
can (and have to) be made. However, the last two proposals will need the consensus of all
Member States, and it is commonly acknowledged that this is very unlikely to happen (Cnossen,
2003). However, it is arguably a less momentous step than the creation of a single European
currency (Devereux, 2004).
To clarify the different issues implicit in each proposal, Table 3.1 classiﬁes each proposal by
where the tax base and the tax rate will be determined and whether the consolidation is
compulsory or not.
Table 3.1 EC proposals, classiﬁcation based on where the tax base and tax rate are determined
Tax base
National (optional) EU (optional) EU (compulsory)
National HST CCBT CHCTB
Tax rate
EU EUCIT
3.1 Commentaries on the 2002 Tax Communication
Devereux (2004) presents a detailed analysis of the report. He argues that the report does not
consider the interaction between corporate and personal taxes, which can also create signiﬁcant
distortions.11 In general he favours the move towards FA, but concludes that only the CHCTB
with a single tax rate will remove all distortions created by the CIT.12 In a related paper, Weiner
(2002) also overviews the 2002 Tax Communication and comments on the possible distortions
that can be introduced by FA, which we mentioned in the previous section. Thus, she also
concludes that most of the distortions can only be eliminated by implementing the harmonised
CHCTB proposal. When moving from the current system to an intermediate one with FA, it is
not clear what the ﬁnal efﬁciency changes will be.
Cnossen (2003) points that the report focuses only on capital allocation distortions between
member states, but not within the states. He argues that these within-country distortions are
signiﬁcant and their elimination should be a prerequisite for between-members tax neutrality. He
also points to the potential distortions that can be introduced by switching from SA to FA.
Since CCBT and HST are the proposals most likely to be implemented, they have attracted
additional attention. Cnossen (2003) ﬁrst argues that both proposals will reduce cross-border
obstacles faced by MNEs, but in turn, this will probably increase tax competition. Secondly,
11 Regarding the interaction of CIT with other taxes, Eggert and Schjelderup (2003) ﬁnd that a FA system is inferior to a
property tax.
12 Note that the CHCTB proposal with a single tax rate will be almost equivalent to the EUCIT. The only difference is that
under EUCIT the CIT revenue will go directly to the EU, and will not be apportioned to the Member States.
28since both systems will operate alongside national tax systems, they could also hamper the
functioning of these systems. Finally, since both systems fall short of full tax rate and base
harmonization, they also face the prospect of not reducing the CIT distortions currently found
under the SA system. When comparing both proposals, Cnossen (2003) points that HST will
intensify tax-related competition for headquarters locations. Thus, HST will create additional
ﬁscal externalities not present under CCBT.
Another paper that compares CCBT and HST is Mintz and Weiner (2003). They employ a
simple model with two countries and a formula that uses only the share of capital to apportion
MNE proﬁts. They ﬁnd that the capital allocation distortion created by this speciﬁc formula can
be positive or negative, but will be greater under HST than under CCBT. This result is driven by
HST increasing the differentiation in effective tax rates faced by businesses operating in the
same country. To sum up, both papers ﬁnd that HST is inferior to CCBT.
Sørensen (2004) points that moving to a FA system will involve the resolution of important
technical issues: how to deﬁne a multinational group13, how to choose a speciﬁc apportionment
formula and how to measure the factors in this formula. He also includes among the
disadvantages of HST, that it will probably imply a loss of tax revenue from an EU perspective,
since MNEs will switch to HST if it implies a lower tax payment. However, HST has the
advantage that it could be immediately adopted by the EU governments.
Another potential problem is that switching to a FA system may not be compulsory for all
ﬁrms and/or Member States. Hence, this situation will not reduce compliance costs as much as
in a compulsory system. In addition, it will leave open the possibility for MNEs to apply tax
planning strategies between participating and non-participating countries (Martens-Weiner,
2006).14 For tax authorities it will also imply the administration of two corporate tax systems,
one for the MNEs and one for domestic ﬁrms. In turn, this may create distortions between large
and small ﬁrms within Member States (Sørensen, 2004).
There is consensus, however, to the need for numerical assessments of the economic
outcomes under different FA proposals in comparison with the current SA system (Devereux,
2004; Gérard, 2002). The welfare implications of the different efﬁciency and compliance costs
will be very valuable to guide policy makers. Moreover, Gérard (2002) advocates for models
that include at least one jurisdiction outside the consolidation region, to assess the ﬂow of funds
between the EU and partner countries (e.g. USA). However, a problem with the construction of
such numerical assessments stems from the vague nature of the four proposals. In particular, the
apportionment formula that will be used is not deﬁned in the 2002 Tax Communication nor in
the 2006 Communication on CCCTB (European Commission, 2006). There is no discussion
about which factors will be included, which weights are applied; and the possibility or not of
member countries to change these weights. All these issues are crucial for the welfare results,
and analytically as important as changing from SA to FA itself.
13 This point is also stressed by Mintz (1999) and Mintz and Weiner (2003).
14 See also section 2.1.3.
29In general, there is consensus that the current system should be changed, but the technical and
political mechanisms to do so are unclear. Thus, the 2002 Tax Communication is seen as only a
ﬁrst step forward towards CIT consolidation.
3.2 Summary and lessons for the EU
Although the 2002 Tax Communication clearly favours a move from the current SA system to
one that uses FA, it does not propose a speciﬁc apportionment formula to be applied. Without a
clearly deﬁned FA system, the economic and welfare implications of the EC proposals are at
best unclear. However, some general conclusions can be drawn.
First, although the EC proposal aims to reduce the efﬁciency distortions and proﬁt shifting
possibilities under SA, it is not clear that moving to FA can actually eliminate these problems. In
fact, these distortions might increase under some circumstances. It all depends on the speciﬁc
FA system implemented. In any case, only when a full tax base and rate harmonization is
applied will all the efﬁciency distortions associated with the CIT disappear.
Second, disregarding the efﬁciency changes expected to occur when moving from SA to FA,
possibly the major advantage of FA is that it creates the possibilities to signiﬁcantly reduce
compliance and administrative costs for businesses and tax authorities (Mintz, 1999). Thus, one
important issue insufﬁciently analysed in the empirical literature, is the relative importance of
these compliance and administrative costs with respect to efﬁciency gains and changes in
government revenue.
Third, the main lesson is that the more uniform the apportionment formula the better. It is
clear that allowing the member states to choose their own factor weights will be suboptimal for
the EU as a whole as it may induce strategic interactions of member states.
The uniform factor weights should be chosen as to be as independent as possible from MNE
decisions. However, which speciﬁc factors can achieve this is unclear. Classic factors are
payroll, property and sales. Alternative suggestions are to use the VAT base or to allow for sector
speciﬁc factors (Mintz, 1999; Mintz and Weiner, 2003; Hellerstein and McLure, 2004; Sørensen,
2004). In addition, the harmonization of the tax base will be a superior option than allowing
member states and MNEs to choose between FA and the current system. Nevertheless, a tax base
harmonization will probably be very difﬁcult to implement politically.
To sum up, deﬁning the speciﬁc apportionment formula that will be applied is a critical issue
that has to be dealt with. In more speciﬁc terms, a positive lesson from the US is the need to
consolidate the income of afﬁliated groups of countries (Hellerstein and McLure, 2004). While
the Canadian experience shows that even with a harmonised tax base, jurisdictions can still use
CIT rates to attract MNE. Thus, in this case the EU as a whole could gain from reduced
compliance costs, while Member States will maintain the advantages of setting their own CIT
rates (Martens-Weiner, 2006). However, there is also the danger that tax differentials under FA
will create their own distortions.
304 The CORTAX model
The proposed reforms of corporate income taxation in the EU are simulated with the general
equilibrium model CORTAX. The development of this model is heavily inspired by the
OECDTAX-model of Sørensen (2001). The same model was used in Bettendorf et al. (2006), but
extended in three ways for the current study. First, the current model includes the US. In contrast
to the European countries, the US applies the worldwide residence-principle for corporate
income taxation. The incorporation of the US also allows us to analyse the consequences of a
country that does not participate in the shift towards tax base consolidation. Second, a system of
tax base consolidation with formula apportionment is speciﬁed for the EU-countries. Thirdly, we
consider compliance costs arising from company taxation. When separate accounting is no
longer obliged for multinationals operational in several jurisdictions, compliance costs are
reduced and efﬁciency gains can be achieved. Simulations with the extendend model can give an
indication about the contribution of lower compliance costs to overall welfare effects.
We ﬁrst describe the main features of the model. Thereafter, the modelling is brieﬂy
discussed per sector. Attention is in particular given to the speciﬁcation of corporate taxation in
subsection 4.4 (including a detailed discussion of the main extensions).15
4.1 Main features of the model
• The model includes 17 EU-countries and the US. The EU-countries are the 15 old member states
(with BEL and LUX joined) and the three largest new member states (CZE, HUN and POL).
• All markets are characterized by perfect competition. Location-speciﬁc rents are, however,
introduced so that proﬁts are not zero.
• All countries produce one homogenous good at the exogenous world price (the net supply by the
rest of the world (ROW) is assumed perfectly elastic at the given price).
• Two type of assets are traded on the world capital market: bonds and equities. Bonds issued in
different countries are considered perfect substitutes, yielding the same given world interest rate.
The same holds for equities. An individual country cannot affect world interest rates (the net
supply of each asset by ROW is assumed perfectly elastic at the given interest rate).
• We focus on the steady state version of the model. Calculation of the full transition path is
beyond the scope of the current project.
15 A detailed technical description of the basic model can be found in Bettendorf and Van der Horst (2006). The
extensions are fully explained in Bettendorf and Van der Horst (2007).
314.2 Households
Following the standard overlapping generations model of Diamond, households are assumed to
live for two periods.16 Household decisions on consumption and labor supply are derived from
the maximization of lifetime utility, which allows for a proper welfare analysis. An individual
only works when young. Young households receive labour income (after taxes) and lump sum
transfers. The difference between total income and consumption expenditures (including taxes)
gives total savings. These savings are invested in bonds and stocks. Since both asset types are
considered imperfect substitutes, an investor prefers to diversify his portfolio over both assets.
Since older households do no work, consumption in the second period has to be ﬁnanced by
capital income (net of taxes), together with lump sum transfers.
Calibration is in general based on data from 2002.17 Consumption expenditures are taken
from the National Accounts, while labour supply is calculated from data on employment in
persons and hours. Values for the main parameters of the household sector are given in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 Key parameters and (semi-)elasticities for households
Population growth 0.5%
Real return on bonds 2.0%
Real return on equity 4.0%





Implied (semi-)elasticities Min Max
Labour supply to wage 0.12 0.28
Savings to interest rate 0.35 0.80
4.3 Firms
Two types of ﬁrms are distinguished: domestic ﬁrms and multinationals. A domestic ﬁrm only
operates in one country. In each country a representative multinational headquarter is located
and each multinational is assumed to own one subsidiary in each foreign country.18 The
decisions by each ﬁrm are derived from maximizing its value.
16 Dividing active life in two parts means that a period spans 40 years. We want to express the variables in annual terms
while keeping the model tractable. We therefore impose that behavior is the same in each year of the period when young
and when old.
17 The assumptions and choices we have made in the calibration procedure are fully explained in Bettendorf and Van der
Horst (2006).
18 The location decision of a subsidiary is thus not modelled. In the absence of entry costs, multinationals only decide on
the size of its subsidiaries.
32Production in each ﬁrm uses three primary factors: labour, (internationally mobile) capital and
location speciﬁc capital.
Location-speciﬁc capital is supplied perfectly inelastically and is internationally immobile.
Since its return, being a rent, is part of the corporate tax base, including this type of capital
motivates a lower bound on the corporate income tax rate. Fixed income is assumed to accrue to
residents of the home country. In this way a tax export channel is incorporated, as host countries
impose the corporate income tax on this income ﬂow.
Labour is also assumed internationally immobile, implying that ﬁrms have to compete for
labour on the local market.
In contrast, capital is perfectly mobile internationally. Although the gross rate of return is
ﬁxed at the world capital market, the user cost of capital depends on country-speciﬁc corporate
and personal taxation systems. Investments can be ﬁnanced by issuing bonds or by retaining
proﬁts (issuing new shares is not allowed). The equity capital of a subsidiary (deﬁned as FDI) is
provided by its parent. The optimal ﬁnancing mix depends on the difference between the cost of
debt ﬁnancing (after corporate taxation) and the required return on retained proﬁts. The latter is
determined by the marginal equity holder, which is assumed to live in the home country. As a
consequence, the required return on the ﬁrms’ equity is determined by the tax rate the domestic
household has to pay on equity income. As debt ﬁnancing is in general tax-favoured, extreme
debt positions are avoided by specifying ﬁnancial distress costs that increase in the debt ratio.
Production in a subsidiary needs in addition an intermediate input that is provided by its
parent company. A headquarter can charge a price for these inputs that deviates from the real
cost. When tax bases are not consolidated, a multinational has an incentive to shift proﬁts to
low-tax countries by setting a low transfer price. Proﬁt shifting remains bounded by specifying
that a multinational has to incur extra costs when applying transfer pricing. Corporate taxation
issues are further discussed in the next subsection.
Table 4.2 Key parameters and (semi-)elasticities of production
Technological growth 1.5%
Economic rate of depreciation 5.0%
Income share of location-speciﬁc capital 2.5%
Income share intermediate inputs in subsidiaries 10.0%
Elasticity of substitution
Labour-capital 0.7
Implied semi-elasticities Min Max
Capital stock to statutory CIT − 0.46 0.09
Incoming FDI to statutory CIT − 1.91 − 0.48
Debt to statutory CIT 0.23 0.38
Incoming transfer price to statutory CIT 0.74 2.14
33The calibration of the ﬁrm sector is summarized in Table 4.2. The capital and labour parameters
in the production functions are determined by country-speciﬁc labour income shares (corrected
for the self-employed). Country-speciﬁc TFP-levels are calibrated from ﬁgures on GDP per
worker. We follow Sørensen (2001) in specifying that domestic ﬁrms use location speciﬁc capital
about twice as much as multinational headquarters (the precise ﬁgure is 0.7/0.3). The amount of
location speciﬁc capital used by each subsidiary is calibrated from data on bilateral FDI-stocks.
4.4 Corporate taxation
We consider two basic principles for taxing corporate income: the source and the residence
principle. Next, we explain how we have translated the reform proposals by the EC in terms of
the model. In the last subsection, the speciﬁcation and calibration of compliance costs are
described.
4.4.1 Source principle
In the basecase all EU-countries tax corporate income on a source basis. The tax base is deﬁned
as the value of output (including the value of intermediate inputs for a multinational
headquarter), minus the wage sum, interest payments on debt and depreciation allowances
(minus the value of intermediate inputs for a subsidiary). The tax rules in the EU-countries only
differ in the value of the depreciation rate for tax purposes. The tax parameters in the EU are
discussed after the modelling of the corporate tax system in the US is explained.
4.4.2 Residence principle
In all simulations the US tax authority adopts the world-wide residence principle (alternatively
known as the method of world-wide credit, see Sørensen (2001)). The US taxes the total
corporate income of its multinationals if the tax bill according to the US-tax rules exceeds the
sum of the taxed paid by the parent and all subsidiaries in the source countries.
We calculate the tax payments of a US-multinational in two steps. The tax base and
payments of US-owned ﬁrms are computed ﬁrst according to the rules of the source country (i.e.
using country-speciﬁc ﬁscal rates of depreciation) and second according to the US-rules. The
multinational has to pay to the US tax authority the difference (only if positive) between the
world-wide tax obligations under the rules of the home country and the world-wide tax
payments summed over all source countries. Notice that transfer pricing is not practiced if the
residence principle is effective (i.e. the US raises taxes from foreign-source income).
4.4.3 Calibration
The key parameters of the CIT system are the statutory tax rate and the ﬁscal depreciation rate,
or more general the rate of tax allowances. The legal tax rates are taken from the Institute for
34Fiscal Studies (IFS), see Devereux et al. (2002), except for the new member states (source:
Finkenzeller and Spengel (2004)) and DNK (source: Nexia International (2005)).
The starting point in the calibration of the tax base is the marginal effective tax rate (METR)
as calculated by IFS. We take the METR for the case where 25% of new investments are ﬁnanced
with debt and 75% with equity. This is lower than the actual debt-equity mix (40%,60%) in order
to ensure reasonable (depreciation) allowances. The rate of tax allowances, which encompass all
kinds of tax deductions, is calibrated such that this METR is reproduced, as it is the best measure
of how corporate income taxes affect the proﬁt-maximising decision on marginal investments.
We restrict the tax allowance rate between 5% and 15%, where the lower bound is given by the
economic rate of depreciation and the upper bound is imposed to avoid the undesirable ‘taxation
paradox’:19 when one allows for generous tax allowances (large difference between ﬁscal and
economic rate of depreciation), simulating a reduction in the corporate tax rate might result in an
increase in the cost of capital and a reduction of the capital stock (see e.g. Sørensen (2002)).
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The resulting values for the statutory tax rates and tax allowance rates are shown in Figure 4.1.20
The observed statutory tax rates ranges from 13% in Ireland to 39% in the US and 40% in
Germany. The calibrated depreciation rate identiﬁes the countries with a narrow tax base (PRT,
ITA and GRC) and with a broad base (IRL and DEU).21
19 Only in Greece the small tax base still implies the taxation paradox, where a tax increase raises investments.
20 A drawback of the calibration procedure is that the observed CIT-revenues are not well reproduced (the revenues are
on average lower than observed: 2.6% versus 3.0%). In an alternative procedure, we calibrated the tax allowance rate on
the observed corporate tax revenues. However, this resulted in implausible high values for this rate, that would give rise to
a negative response of the capital stock to a reduction in the corporate tax rate.
21 The broad tax base of Germany is a result of the calibration choice, where the rate of tax allowances is derived from the
354.4.4 Formula apportionment
First, consolidation of the tax base for a multinational simply amounts to summing the tax bases
of all ﬁrms that are located in a country that participates in the new system. Under home-state
taxation, the rules of the parent country are applied. In the alternative proposals, see Table 3.1,
European rules for ﬁscal depreciation and the like are applied.
Second, this tax base is apportioned to the participating tax authorities according to a
prescribed formula. Each country is assigned a share φi,j of the tax base, which it may tax at its
own tax rate τπ,j (except with EUCT). This share is calculated as a weighted average of three
factors: employment, capital stock and production:22
φij = f LLi,j
Li





The weights of the three factors, denoted by f L,K,Y, sum to one. The variable Lij denotes
employment by a subsidiary in source country j of a multinational from home country i. Total
employment by multinational i is thus given by Li = åjLij. When the consolidated tax base is
allocated according to the labour shares, jurisdiction j thus receives a fraction Lij/Li. The same
notation applies for the capital and production factor. One can easily check that the shares sum
to one for each multinational (åj φij = 1). Our starting point in the next section is a broad
formula with equal weights on employment, capital and production, i.e. f L = f K = fY = 1/3.
Alternative formulae are investigated in section 6.
The tax rate relevant for decisions by multinationals can be written as a weighted average of






In the determination of optimal input demands, multinationals take into account that they can
affect the φ-shares to minimise the overall tax rate τ
fa
π .
To simplify the analysis, we consider that the FA-system is mandatory for the multinationals.
Allowing for the proposed free choice between SA and FA would complicate the analysis
considerably.23
marginal effective tax rate of the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), see Devereux et al. (2002). Calibration on tax revenues
would imply a narrower base for Germany. This calibration choice affects the detailed results for Germany, but does not
change the key messages of the paper.
22 In practice, it is a difﬁcult to deﬁne capital and to a lesser extent employment and production. This issue is outside the
scope of the current document, but interested readers might consult Martens-Weiner (2006). A second remark concerns
the choice of production instead of sales as a factor in the apportionment formula. In the current version of our model, we
are unable to deﬁne the destination of sales, as only the total exports of each country are known. This prohibits the use of
sales in the formula, and we include output instead.
23 The analysis would be easy if the discrete choice between the SA and FA system could be determined before solving
364.4.5 Compliance costs
A motivation for tax base consolidation is to reduce tax compliance costs for multinationals. The
European Commission (2004a) reports extensive evidence on perceived compliance costs (these
include costs required for company taxation and VAT, next to costs voluntarily incurred to
minimize taxes). Compliance costs are estimated at 1.9% and 30.9% of taxes paid by large ﬁrms
and SMEs, respectively.24 Costs are larger for ﬁrms with subsidiaries. The European
Commission (2001) focuses on costs related to transfer pricing. Estimates range from 1 to 2
million euro for medium-sized enterprises and 4 to 5.5 million euro for large multinational
groups. Compliance costs of 7.5 million euro would amount to 3% of CIT revenues. Devereux
(2004) concludes from this EC-report that compliance costs likely amount to 2.7% to 4% of tax
revenues.
As evidence suggests that compliance costs decrease relatively with the size of the ﬁrms,
these costs could be modelled as a ﬁxed cost. The disadvantage of this speciﬁcation is that a
reduction of compliance costs will not directly affect any of the ﬁrm’s decisions. This simulation
will only result in a direct, positive effect on the output volume when compliance costs are
modelled as a variable cost. We therefore prefer to model these costs by introducing a new type
of ‘unproductive’ workers that are needed to keep the tax administration. This overhead labour is
speciﬁed as a ﬁxed fraction of the productive workers, increasing the wage cost by this fraction.
Since ﬁrm-speciﬁc, nor country-speciﬁc ﬁgures are available, the fraction of overhead labour
is kept the same for all ﬁrms. This fraction is calibrated at 0.43%, such that the simulated
compliance costs amount to 10% of the CIT-revenues in the EU. When simulating a switch to
the FA-system, compliance costs are abolished for all subsidiaries.
4.5 Rest of the government
Besides taxes on corporate income, tax revenues consist of residence-based taxes on labour
income, dividends, capital gains, interest income and consumption. The expenditure side
contains government consumption, interest payments on public debt and lump sum transfers.
Government consumption as well as public debt are constant fractions of GDP.
Government behaviour is not derived from any optimisation but is exogenously speciﬁed.
When corporate tax revenues change after a reform, a speciﬁed tax rate has to be adjusted to
close the government budget. In most of the simulations, the labour tax rate is chosen for this
purpose.
the model. However, in this case choosing the tax system with the lowest tax obligations obviously requires the full
general equilibrium solution.
24 Small- and medium-sized enterprises are deﬁned as companies with less than 250 employees.
374.6 General equilibrium
Equilibrium must hold on each market:
• The labour market: the country-speciﬁc wage adjusts to ensure that domestic supply meets
domestic demand.
• The goods market: the surplus of production over domestic demand leads to net exports; the rest
of the world is willing to absorb any volume of net exports at the ﬁxed world price. The goods
price acts as numeraire.
• The bonds market: all types of bonds (domestic or foreign, issued by ﬁrms or government) are
perfect substitutes with a ﬁxed return; the net supply of bonds by the rest of world is assumed to
be perfectly elastic.
• The equity market: all types of equity (domestic or foreign) are perfect substitutes with a ﬁxed
return; the net supply of equity by the rest of the world is assumed to be perfectly elastic.
• The current account equals the change in the net foreign asset position (on the balance of
payments) if all previous markets are in equilibrium (due to Walras law).25
4.7 Main features of the Basecase
Table 4.3 focuses on features of the base path (with SA), that are needed to understand
differences in simulation outcomes over the countries.
1. The capital/labour ratio (relative to EU-average) identiﬁes the labour intensive (the three new
members and POL) and the capital-intensive countries (FRA and IRL). These different factor
intensities will explain how the outcomes depend on the weights of the factors in the formula.
2. Variations in the wage rate are related to variations in the capital/labour ratio. Low-wage
countries are attractive for multinationals that want to expand employment.
3. The inward FDI stock (%GDP) indicates the importance of foreign subsidiaries in countries, as
IRL, BLU and NLD. More open economies are subject to larger international spillovers. Small
countries (NLD, BLU) also seem to be large FDI-exporters (as % of home GDP).
4. The following variables describe the taxation systems. The statutory corporate tax rate is known
to vary considerably in the EU (from 13% in IRL to 40% in DEU in 2002).
5. The effective tax rate also depends on the deprecation rate for tax purposes (see also Figure 4.1).
GRC and ITA are characterized by a narrow tax base; in contrast, DEU and IRL are examples of
countries with a broad base.
6. In the simulations the labour tax rate is adjusted to close the government budget. In cases in
which tax revenues fall after a corporate tax reform, welfare losses will be larger for countries
with a high initial labour tax rate (like SWE).
25 This condition is also fulﬁlled for the rest of the world.
387. Finally, the importance of multinationals is also reﬂected in the fraction of corporate income
taxes paid by domestic ﬁrms. Notice that in ﬁrst instance the consolidation reforms only affect
the multinationals. More than half of the CIT revenues originates from multinationals in BLU,
IRL and NLD.
Table 4.3 Characterisation of the base path
IRL HUN POL SWE CZE FIN DNK GBR PRT
Capital/Labour (EU=1) 1.58 0.63 0.40 0.76 0.57 1.05 0.90 0.70 0.42
Wage (EU=1) 1.12 0.50 0.41 0.95 0.43 0.89 0.98 1.05 0.67
FDI_in (%GDP) 0.93 0.14 0.09 0.36 0.12 0.16 0.36 0.28 0.13
FDI_out (%GDP) 0.22 0.01 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.31 0.22 0.29 0.06
CIT rate 0.13 0.18 0.19 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.33
Tax allowance rate 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.08
Labour tax rate 0.17 0.33 0.25 0.47 0.35 0.38 0.34 0.22 0.24
CIT domestic ﬁrms (%CIT) 0.36 0.65 0.66 0.50 0.66 0.63 0.53 0.52 0.62
BLU AUT NLD GRC ESP FRA ITA USA DEU
Capital/Labour (EU=1) 0.95 0.88 1.02 0.71 0.94 1.29 1.16 1.12 1.03
Wage (EU=1) 1.21 1.02 1.16 0.69 0.78 1.20 0.97 1.10 0.95
FDI_in (%GDP) 0.73 0.15 0.50 0.04 0.11 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.12
FDI_out (%GDP) 0.66 0.09 0.84 0.01 0.03 0.23 0.06 0.06 0.20
CIT rate 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.39 0.40
Tax allowance rate 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.05
Labour tax rate 0.38 0.39 0.31 0.26 0.28 0.38 0.35 0.22 0.34
CIT domestic ﬁrms (%CIT) 0.30 0.63 0.47 0.68 0.66 0.65 0.68 0.67 0.66
39405 Common consolidated base taxation
In a recent communication, the European Commission (2006, p.3) emphasises the need for
consolidation and proposes to proceed along the lines of the Common Consolidated Base
Taxation (CCBT).26 This section intends to shed light on the economic and welfare implications
of this proposal with the use of CORTAX. Several choices have to be made, however, whose
impact will be investigated in sections 5.5 and 6. First, we assume that the tax base is
harmonised at the current EU average, which is the most natural candidate to start with. Second,
we assume that the apportionment formula is deﬁned on employment, capital and production,
each with equal weight. Third, budget surpluses or deﬁcits are compensated with a change in the
labour tax rate. Finally, capital is assumed to be internationally mobile, unlike labour.
The main results of this section are previewed in Figure 5.1. The ﬁgure shows which member
states will beneﬁt from the introduction of CCBT, in terms of GDP and welfare (see Table 5.1
for more details on the economic effects per member state). The proposal is slightly beneﬁcial
for the EU on average, but within the EU the member states with a large share of FDI, a
below-average tax rate and a broader-than-average tax base tend to gain.
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a The black bar shows the average of GDP-growth of each group of countries. The grey bar shows the change in welfare (as %GDP).
Countries with a tax rate below average are: IRL, HUN, POL, SWE, CZE, FIN, DNK and GBR. Countries with a relatively small tax base
are: GRC, ITA, PRT, SWE, ESP, AUT and FRA. Relatively closed member states are: GRC, ITA, ESP, PRT, CZE, POL, FRA and HUN.
For each criterion, the other group consists of the missing member states.
26 The CCBT has been relabeled in European Commission (2006, p.3) to the ‘Common Consolidated Corporate Tax
Base’.
41This result is further explained in the following subsections, where we ﬁrst show the direct effect
of consolidation and formula apportionment and subsequently investigate its impact on ﬁrms,
governments and the whole economy. The ﬁnal subsections show the robustness of the key
results for alternative assumptions on the rate of tax allowances, on the ﬁnancing of deﬁcits and
on the international mobility of capital. The implications of alternative apportionment formulae
are investigated in section 6.
5.1 Direct effects of consolidation and formula apportionment
Consolidation implies that the subsidiaries of a European multinational are treated as a single
entity for tax purposes. The main arguments in favour of consolidation, as listed in section 2, are
taken into account in our model. First, we assume that multinationals save on compliance costs,
as they have to ﬁle only one (consolidated) corporate income tax return, where all afﬁliates are
included. Second, consolidation makes proﬁt shifting for tax purposes obsolete, as all proﬁts are
added up in a single tax base. In our model, this implies that transfer pricing, i.e. charging
different prices for intra-ﬁrm exports than for regular exports, becomes redundant.27
One of the key issues of the introduction of a common consolidated tax base is the broadness
of the existing base. As explained in section 4, we have captured this broadness by the rate of tax
allowances, see Table 4.3. In this section, we assume that the EU chooses the (population)
weighted average of the existing allowances (7.2%). Compared with the existing tax systems,
the choice for a common tax base implies a broadening of the tax base in 7 countries (France,
Austria, Spain, Sweden, Portugal, Italy and Greece), whereas the tax base is narrowed in the
other ten countries, see Table 4.3. Note that the tax base is consolidated and harmonised for
multinational enterprises (MNEs) only. Domestic ﬁrms still have to apply to the home tax rules.
In addition to the change in the tax base, MNEs are confronted with a change in their average
tax rate, which is calculated as a weighted average of the statutory rates of the countries in which
the MNEs operate. Under separate accounting, the statutory rates are weighted with the share of
each subsidiary in the total tax base of the MNE. For a ﬁrm in a low-tax country, like Ireland, this
implies that the average tax rate is higher (3 percentage points) than the Irish statutory rate, see
Figure 5.2. Key feature of separate accounting is that MNEs are able to affect their tax payments
by shifting paper proﬁts to low-tax countries. This reduces the average tax rate, in particular for
ﬁrms with large production shares in the low-tax countries (which is usually the headquarter).
If formula apportionment is introduced, MNEs have to pay taxes proportional to the factors
in the formula (labour, capital and production). However, these factors are less biased than the
tax base towards the low-tax countries – at least in the initial situation (as shown in the ex-ante
27 In addition, cross-border loss offset automatically occurs with tax base consolidation. This aspect is, however, hardly
relevant in our model, given its steady state nature, where both parent ﬁrms and their subsidiaries generally generate
positive proﬁts.
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a Average tax rate of multinationals under separate accounting, formula apportionment – both before and after ﬁrms’ responses. The
initial tax rates are indicated on the x-axis.
bars in Figure 5.2). As a result, the introduction of formula apportionment raises the ex ante
average tax rate in nearly all member states, most notably in Ireland.
Multinational enterprises may respond to formula apportionment by restructuring their
production. They are able to reduce their tax payments, and thereby their average tax rate, by
raising employment, investment and production in low-tax countries and reducing them in
high-tax countries. Figure 5.2 shows that this reallocation reduces the average tax rate (ex post)
in all member states, in particular in countries (like Ireland and the Netherlands) with strong
international investment positions.
5.2 Firms
We have seen that formula apportionment induces reallocation, just as separate accounting leads
to proﬁt shifting.28 How does this reallocation take place, and do ﬁrms beneﬁt from it?
Reallocation of labour across the border is very difﬁcult (and in our model even impossible)
as labour is hardly mobile internationally (immobile in our model). For example, the only way a
German multinational can hire extra workers for its Polish subsidiary is by attracting
employment from other Polish ﬁrms (including domestic ﬁrms, the domestic parents of MNEs
and subsidiaries from other foreign ﬁrms) or from new labour supply. Therefore, the
28 The incentives for reallocation are shown in the box on page 44.
43The incentive to reallocate
How large is the incentive for ﬁrms to reallocate? With the formula based on employment, capital and production shares,
MNEs inﬂuence the average tax rate by raising the factors in low-tax countries and reducing them in high-tax countries. If
we concentrate on employment, the question becomes how large are the gains from boosting or reducing employment?
In addition to the regular return on employment (generating production), additional employment may pay off in terms of
lowering the average CIT-rate or it may reduce the return by raising the average tax rate on corporate income. This effect
distorts labour demand and is therefore known as the excise tax (or subsidy) on labour (the excise tax is explained in a
box on page 20).
How large is the excise tax on labour? The ﬁgure on the incentive for reallocation shows for MNEs in a selection of
countries the excise tax as fraction of the initial wage rate. The adjustment ranges between an excise tax of 4% for a Irish
subsidiary in Germany and a subsidy of 6% for a German subsidiary in Hungary. Additional employment in the German
subsidiary in Poland reduces the average CIT rate for the German multinational, which allows the German ﬁrm to pay
higher wages or employ more workers. The opposite holds for an Irish subsidiary in Germany. The median excise tax in
the EU is about 1%, triggering higher labour demand in about half of the subsidiaries but tempering demand in the other
half.
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a The ﬁgure shows the range of excise taxes or subsidies for MNEs hosted in a selection of countries. For example, the excise tax for
subsidiaries in Poland ranges between −6% for the German subsidiaries and 0% for the Irish subsidiaries.
introduction of formula apportionment with a heavy weight on labour induces a reallocation
between ﬁrms within a country. Reallocation of the second factor in the apportionment formula,
namely capital, can occur both within countries and across the border. However, the possibilities
for ﬁrms to expand capital are limited by the production structure: ﬁrms need both capital and
labour (with substitution elasticity of 0.7) in the production process. Finally, the reallocation of
production requires the reallocation of the production factors, namely labour and capital.
The reallocation of production by MNEs are determined by three effects, which all show up
in Figure 5.3. The base harmonisation effect implies that ﬁrms want to avoid the effect of tax
base broadening by reducing production in countries with initially small tax bases. In addition,
the uneven treatment of multinationals and domestic ﬁrms determines the distribution of
employment (and thereby investment) within each member state. In countries with a broad
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‘own’ base, to which the domestic ﬁrms still have to apply, employment will be shifted towards
MNEs who beneﬁt from the narrower European tax base. This effect is clearly visible in all
countries with a broader-than-average tax base (all countries from Ireland to Denmark). The
opposite shift from MNEs towards domestic ﬁrms is visible in member states with narrow bases
like Greece and Italy.29
The direct tax burden effect implies that MNEs want to reduce employment and investment
in subsidiaries where the average ex ante tax rate increases, which are the countries with low
statutory rates, cf Figure 5.2. This implies a reduction of employment and capital by MNEs –
both parents and subsidiaries – in low-tax countries (like Ireland, Hungary and Poland) and an
increase of both production factors in high-tax countries like Germany and Italy.
The reallocation effect implies that ﬁrms want to beneﬁt from the opportunity to reduce the
tax burden by shifting labour, capital and production to low-tax countries. A larger share of these
factors in a low-tax country implies that a large share of the consolidated tax base is apportioned
to these low-tax countries. In particular subsidiaries in low-tax countries respond to the
opportunities for tax planning which the apportionment formula provides: subsidiaries in
Ireland, Hungary and Poland expand at the expense of domestic ﬁrms and MNE-headquarters.
29 The latter effect depends on the assumption that all MNEs are subject to the common tax rules. If they are allowed to
choose between consolidation or the current system of separate accounting, they might prefer the latter.
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a Relative change in the value of the ﬁrm (both multinational and domestic ﬁrms) by changing from SA to FA.
Does an expansion (or reduction) of employment, capital and production by a MNE also imply
that this ﬁrm gains (or loses) from the introduction of the Common Consolidated Base
Taxation?30 The answer is afﬁrmative: multinational enterprises which beneﬁt from a narrower
tax base and a reduction in the average tax rate do so in terms of both employment and of
proﬁtability (as reﬂected in the value of the ﬁrm), see Figure 5.4.
Most remarkable in this ﬁgure is, however, the strong impact of CCBT on the value of
domestic ﬁrms. The reason is that the expansion of employment by MNEs have to be met by
additional labour supply or by workers currently working in domestic ﬁrms. Wages in these
countries are bid up, which raises the labour costs of domestic ﬁrms and reduces their
proﬁtability.
5.3 Government
Until now, we have looked at the implications of common consolidated base taxation for ﬁrms.
We now switch our attention to governments which receive taxes from all ﬁrms in their
jurisdiction (domestic ﬁrms and both domestic and foreign multinationals). Does the change
from separate accounting to consolidation with formula apportionment affect the tax revenues of
governments?
30 Observe that this answer cannot be easily induced from Figure 5.3, as the subsidiaries of all foreign MNEs are added
up in the host country – what we need for this question is the employment in all member states of each MNE.
46First, it should be made very clear that we assume that governments do not raise or cut their
statutory tax rates. Figure 5.2, which shows the changes in tax rates for multinationals, tells
nothing about the statutory rate, but only shows the average rate (averaged over all statutory
rates) which MNEs have to pay over their corporate income. Governments only change the
calculation of the tax base. Under separate accounting (with the source principle) they intend to
tax the proﬁts generated in their country. With consolidation and formula apportionment,
governments tax the apportioned share of the total proﬁts of each MNE. So changes in
CIT-revenues, which are shown in Figure 5.5, reﬂect changes in the tax base, not in the tax rate.
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a Change in the revenues from the corporate income tax in percentage of GDP by changing from SA to FA, before and after reallocation.
Countries are ranked according to their tax base.
Figure 5.5 decomposes the change in CIT-revenues in two parts. The ex ante part shows the
impact of consolidation with formula apportionment as if ﬁrms do not respond. The dominant
effect is the base harmonisation effect. Countries with an initially narrow base, in which the tax
base is broadened to the EU average, will gain revenues, and vice versa. More complex is the
impact of consolidation on the tax revenues. Under separate accounting a government taxes all
ﬁrms located in the home country. In the new system a government may tax part (the
apportioned part) of the consolidated base of all MNEs, next to total corporate income of
domestic ﬁrms. The net impact of this second effect is ambiguous.
Firms respond to the change in the tax system by reallocating production, as we have seen in
the previous section. Strong reallocation occurs in countries with extreme tax bases. For
example, Italy and Greece are confronted with a strong outﬂow of MNEs, which implies a
47reallocation of labour and capital to domestic ﬁrms. This raises the CIT-revenues in both
countries as the domestic ﬁrms are fully taxed at home, whereas MNEs can be taxed only partly.
At the other extreme, countries in which the tax base is narrowed become more attractive for
MNEs, at the expense of domestic ﬁrms. The higher corporate income in these countries is,
however, only partly taxed by the domestic government.
The corporate income tax is, however, not the only source of revenues of the government –
taxes on labour income and consumption are quantitatively more important. Reallocation has
also important implications for the revenues of these taxes. In fact, in countries where
production by MNEs shrinks, the reduced demand for labour cuts down wages and tempers
consumption, which narrows the tax base of consumption and labour income. These changes in
revenues from the taxes on labour income and consumption tend to counterbalance the change in
CIT revenues: in countries where MNEs bid up wages, CIT revenues will decline, but the
revenues of both other taxes improve.
The additional tax revenues (and vice versa for a loss of revenues) can be used for additional
government expenditures, for a reduction in the CIT-rate or for a reduction in another tax rate. In
the analysis, it is a bit arbitrary which of these alternatives are used. We did not choose the
CIT-rate, because the change in the CIT-rate would interfere in the analysis with a change in the
tax base. Alternatively, we opt for the labour tax to compensate for any change in the
government budget.31 Table 5.1 shows that the labour tax rate has to be increased in countries
with high CIT rates, where the opposite holds for low-tax countries.
5.4 Economy and welfare
Growth and jobs are central aims of European as well as national policies. In a recent
communication, the European Commission (2006, p.3) expresses the expectation that
“(e)liminating tax obstacles such as high compliance costs for cross-border operations and
transfer pricing and the lack of cross-border loss compensation in the internal market can
contribute to these goals.” How successful is, according to our model, the consolidation of the
corporate tax base and the use of formula apportionment in reaching both goals?32
Table 5.1 shows that CCBT slightly boosts GDP, but does not improve employment on
average in the EU. The main stimulus for growth and employment is the consolidation of the tax
base at the common European rate. This efﬁciency gain would even be larger if the tax base for
all ﬁrms is harmonised. The change in tax planning strategies is about neutral for growth. On the
31 See section 5.5 for the alternative simulation where the consumption tax is used to close the budget.
32 Cross-border loss compensation is hardly beneﬁcial in our model, as almost all ﬁrms (and in the base case all ﬁrms)
have positive proﬁts due to the rents on location speciﬁc capital. The model therefore underestimates the gains from
consolidation, which might be substantial in the short run, but will be much smaller in the steady state, see Nicodème
(2006).
48Table 5.1 Economic and welfare effects of Common Consolidated Base Taxationa
Countryb CIT τl w L K GDP CV
(y) (a) (r) (r) (r) (r) (y)
Ireland − 0.32 − 0.45 1.50 0.71 0.21 − 0.60 0.59
Hungary − 0.05 − 0.33 0.69 0.39 1.09 0.13 0.35
Poland − 0.02 − 0.29 0.51 0.26 0.86 0.09 0.31
Sweden 0.02 − 0.36 0.10 0.20 − 0.06 0.03 0.31
Czech Republic 0.00 − 0.19 0.19 0.11 0.37 0.05 0.14
Finland − 0.19 0.15 0.59 0.09 1.21 0.44 0.13
Denmark − 0.03 − 0.08 0.14 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.15
United Kingdom − 0.09 − 0.01 0.38 0.07 1.05 0.16 0.19
Portugal 0.08 − 0.29 − 0.11 0.04 − 0.40 − 0.06 0.15
Belgium & Luxembourg − 0.12 − 0.03 0.48 0.07 1.21 0.49 0.32
Austria 0.02 − 0.01 − 0.06 − 0.03 − 0.17 − 0.11 0.00
Netherlands − 0.16 0.29 0.44 − 0.13 1.46 0.32 0.14
Greece 0.10 0.03 − 0.77 − 0.14 − 1.51 − 0.72 − 0.41
Spain 0.03 − 0.03 − 0.12 − 0.02 − 0.25 − 0.09 − 0.03
France 0.00 0.26 − 0.10 − 0.21 − 0.31 − 0.22 − 0.15
Italy 0.13 0.15 − 0.70 − 0.26 − 1.34 − 0.73 − 0.37
Germany − 0.31 0.60 0.87 − 0.07 2.56 0.74 0.04
EU − 0.07 0.12 0.17 − 0.02 0.50 0.05 0.01
USA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 − 0.01
a Formula apportionment is assumed to depend on employment, capital and output with equal weights.
b CIT: change in revenues from corporate income tax, as share of GDP (y); τl: absolute (a) change in labour-tax rate; w, L, K and GDP:
relative (r) change in respectively the wage rate, employment, capital and gross domestic production; CV: change in welfare, as fraction
of GDP.
one hand transfer pricing is eliminated, which reduces growth. The reason is that transfer pricing
alleviates the tax burden for MNEs, and is therefore good for growth. On the other hand, new tax
planning strategies will be applied by MNEs to alleviate the tax burden in the new system with
formula apportionment. With the current formula, with equal weights on employment, capital
and production, both effects cancel out in terms of GDP. The reason why employment does not
increase is that the loss of tax revenues has to be compensated with an increase in the labour tax
rate, which reduces the supply of labour.
Figure 5.1 shows that GDP increases in relatively open member states with low tax rates and
broad tax bases (all measured relative to the EU average). In the countries which fulﬁll these
three requirements, namely Denmark, Finland, Ireland and the UK, employment and production
increases.33 On the other hand, in relatively closed member states with a small tax base and a
high tax rate, namely Greece, Italy and France, employment and GDP decline. The single
33 GDP at ‘real’ prices, however, declines in Ireland, due to the abolishment of transfer pricing. Under SA, intermediate
inputs where imported at 2/3 of the standard (unit) price. These inputs have to be bought at the unit price under FA, which
reduces its GDP at ‘real’ prices by 0.6%. Without this ‘price effect’, production in Ireland increases by 0.5%. Similar
effects, but much smaller in magnitude appear in other low-tax economies. At the other extreme, GDP in high tax
countries is overstated, but only slightly.
49exception is Portugal where the reduction in the labour tax rate dominates the employment effect.
The intuition behind this result is the following. Production by MNEs becomes more proﬁtable
in countries where the European base is narrower than the tax base of the member state. In
addition, optimal tax planning by MNEs imply that they shift activities to the low-tax countries.
Both effects are particularly large in member states with a large share of multinationals.
How does consolidation in the EU affect an outside country, like the United States?
According to Table 5.1, this inﬂuence is very limited. The main reason is that consolidation does
not directly affect US multinationals. Only through reallocation of employment towards (or
away from) US subsidiaries might they beneﬁt (or lose) from the consolidation in the European
Union. However, this reallocation is signiﬁcant for particular countries, but hardly affects labour
demand on average.
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a The change in welfare (%GDP) is the result of the introduction of CCBT, with the one-third apportionment formula on employment,
capital and production, and where governments adjust the labour-tax rate to balance the budget. The countries are located at their
statutory tax rate and the initial rate of tax deductions.
Figure 5.6 shows the welfare effects of the introduction of a common consolidated tax base with
formula apportionment on employment, capital and production. Both axes show the key factors
determining the distribution of winners and losers. The winners are concentrated in the
lower-left part of the graph, characterised by low tax rates and low tax allowances. The losers
are located in the upper-right part, with high tax rates and small tax bases.
In the EU, there are winners and losers from a common consolidation tax base. On average,
Europe hardly beneﬁts (about 0.01% of GDP). The gains from a reduction in compliance costs
and the elimination of transfer pricing are in balance with the efﬁciency losses from reallocation.
505.5 Alternative simulations
5.5.1 A smaller or broader base
We have assumed in the previous analysis that the common tax base is set at the EU-average
(with a tax allowance rate of 7.2%). Though reasonable, this choice is arbitrary – the common
tax base can as well be set at a broader or smaller level. How sensitive are the results for the
assumption regarding the tax base? We investigate two alternatives, namely a broader base with
a tax allowance rate of δEU
t = 5% and a narrower base with a rate of δEU
t = 10%.
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a The left (right) panel shows the changes of GDP (black) and welfare (grey) if the tax base is harmonised at the tax allowance rate of
5% (10%). See Figure 5.1 for the criteria.
Figure 5.7 repeats the introductory graph (Figure 5.1) for both a broader (left panel) and a
narrower common base. The EU-bars shows that a broader tax base creates a welfare loss and
reduces GDP. The opposite holds for a narrowing of the base, where the welfare gain amounts to
0.10% of GDP. Broadening the base implies a higher tax burden for MNEs which have to cut
down production. The gains from base broadening, as higher tax revenues allow for a reduction
of the labour tax rate, cannot offset this production and welfare loss. The oppositie holds for a
narrowing of the tax base, which beneﬁts all member states except Germany, Italy and Greece.
The distribution of the GDP-growth (or reduction) and the welfare gain (or loss) over the
member states is similar as before: relatively open member states with low tax rates and broad
tax bases tend to gain more (or lose less) that relatively closed member states with high tax rates
and narrow tax bases.
5.5.2 Alternative means of ﬁnancing
A realistic way for the government to balance its budget is by adjusting its labour tax rate.
Reliance on the indirect tax on consumption is, however, also plausible. How would this affect
the economic and welfare effects?
51Bettendorf et al. (2006) have shown that the consumption tax is less distortive than the labour tax
rate. This implies that if the tax-base reform in a particular country requires an increase in an
alternative tax rate, then this country would gain more (or lose less) if the consumption tax may
be applied – and vice versa for a country which may reduce the alternative tax rate.
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a The grey bars show, for a selection of countries, the changes of GDP and welfare if the budget is closed with the consumption tax rate
instead of the labour tax rate (black bars). See Figure 5.1 for the criteria.
Figure 5.8 shows for a selection of countries the implications for GDP and welfare of this
alternative means of ﬁnancing. In countries with an initially low CIT-rate (Ireland and Poland),
the tax reform allows for a reduction in the labour income or consumption tax rates (of
respectively 0.45 and 0.30 percentage points). It is therefore not surprising that the switch to
consumption-tax ﬁnancing reduces GDP and welfare relative to the labour-tax case. For the
United Kingdom, the CIT-reform hardly affects tax revenues. The required change in the
alternative tax rates, and its implications for GDP and welfare are therefore negligible. In the
remaining four countries, the labour income or consumption tax rates has to be increased, which
explains the better performance in terms of GDP and welfare of consumption-tax ﬁnancing in
these countries.
The EU on average is slightly better of with consumption-tax ﬁnancing than with labour-tax
ﬁnancing: the GDP-effect doubles to 0.11% and the increase in welfare becomes 0.04% of GDP.
Again this can be traced back to the required increase in the labour income or consumption tax
rate of about 0.1 percentage points, in combination with the smaller distortiveness of the latter.
Despite these small differences, the main message from the alternative means of ﬁnancing is that
this choice does not drive the results and does not alter the key message of this section. The
consolidation with formula apportionment eliminates one way of tax planning but introduces
another: transfer pricing is exchanged for reallocation. This change in tax planning hardly
beneﬁts GDP and welfare on average, but strongly affects the distribution of both.
525.5.3 Less mobile capital
The ﬁnal assumption we investigate in this section is the international mobility of capital. Up to
now, we have assumed that the rest of the world is willing to supply (or demand) any amount of
capital at the given world interest rate. Consider the alternative extreme, that capital is
internationally immobile, or domestic capital markets are closed. How would this drastic change
in the model affect the results? In other words, how strongly are the results driven by the
assumption on capital mobility?
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Figure 5.9 shows the impact on GDP of the introduction of CCTB for different assumptions of
capital mobility. For the EU on average, the mobility of capital hardly matters. However, for
some member states the mobility of capital matters a lot: low-tax countries produce more and
high-tax countries produce less if capital is immobile. The main reason for this result is that
consolidation with formula apportionment has a positive effect on wages (see Table 5.1), and
therefore on savings in low-tax countries. With highly mobile capital the households in these
countries can easily invest their additional savings in other countries. If capital is immobile,
however, additional savings have to be met by the domestic market which drives the return to
debt and equity down and stimulates domestic investment. As a result, employment and GDP in
low-tax countries raise more if capital is internationally immobile – and vice versa for high-tax
countries. Similarly, both the welfare gain in low-tax countries and the welfare loss in member
states with high tax rates are aggravated if capital is immobile.
53Conclusion
The key message of this section is that tax planning hardly beneﬁts GDP and welfare on average,
but that the gains and losses are unevenly distributed. The gains for the whole Union, in terms of
a reduction in compliance costs and the redundancy of transfer pricing, are offset by the
distortive effect of reallocation. Within the EU, member states with large shares of inward and
outward FDI, with low tax rates and with broad tax bases tend to gain.
The sensitivity analysis in this chapter reveals that this conclusion holds for alternative
assumptions about the mobility of capital and the compensation of budget deﬁcits or surpluses.
The broadness of the common base, however, largely inﬂuences the gains from consolidation,
where a narrower base is beneﬁcial for nearly all countries, whereas almost all member states
lose with a very broad common consolidated tax base.
546 The choice of the apportionment formula matters
The European Commission (2006) acknowledges that consolidation involves ‘possible
mechanisms such as formula apportionment’, but is still silent on which formula should be
adopted. In the previous section, we have assumed a particular formula, namely with equal
weights on employment, capital and production. The current section explores the economic and
welfare effects of alternative formulae, see box. One crucial assumption is adopted throughout,
namely that all member states adopt the same formula with same weights. Competition between
member states in the choice of formula or the relative weights of each factor is outside the scope
of the current paper.34
The main results of this section are previewed in Figure 6.1. The largest beneﬁts are obtained
for the EU on average if either production or payroll are included with unit weight in the
apportionment formula. In contrast, a unit weight on either employment or capital reduces
welfare in the EU. The apportionment formula of the previous section takes an intermediate
position, with slightly positive effects on both GDP and welfare. In the remaining of this section
we explain these results by showing the implications of alternative formulae on reallocation and
government revenues.
Figure 6.1 Impact of alternative apportionment formulae on GDP and welfare in the EU (average)








34 Section 2 concludes from the literature that the ability of each jurisdiction to change and strategically determine its
factor weights, has in general, negative welfare implications. Competition in tax rates is discussed in section 7.
55Alternative apportionment formulae
We explore the following alternative formulae (see box on page 18):


















• production: unit weight on production; φj =
Yj
Y
• employment: unit weight on employment; φj =
Lj
L
• capital: unit weight on capital; φj =
Kj
K
• payroll: unit weight on payroll; φj =
(WL)j
WL
The formula with unit weight on payroll has very similar effects as the formula with unit weight on production, and is
therefore omitted from the subsequent analysis.
6.1 Ireland and Portugal
Two characteristics of the member states are crucial in the impact of the apportionment formula
on the economic and welfare effects, namely the tax rate and the capital intensity. To highlight
the working of both effects, we concentrate on two member states with extreme values, namely
Ireland and Portugal. Ireland combines a low tax rate with a capital-intensive production
structure, whereas Portugal has a much higher tax rate (at the EU-average of 33%) and a
labour-intensive production structure. We investigate the impact of the apportionment formula
on the tax payments by MNEs and the tax revenues of governments.
The ﬁrst side of the picture is the impact of the apportionment formula on the average tax
rate levied on multinationals. We expect this change to depend crucially on the following
characteristics of MNEs. First, the production structure of subsidiaries are equal to the structure
of the country in which they are located. Moreover, MNEs are relatively large in their home
country. Thus, the Irish MNE has a relatively capital intensive production structure, whereas the
Portuguese MNE is labour intensive. This implies that the Irish MNE will be weakly affected by
formula apportionment if capital gets a high weight, as a large share of capital is concentrated in
the capital-intensive and large parent ﬁrms. However, if labour gets a high weight, then a larger
share of the consolidated base will be apportioned to the member states in which its subsidiaries
are located, having higher tax rates. Things will be less clear cut for the Portuguese ﬁrm as its
parent is located in a member state with an average tax rate. The impact of the weighting scheme
will depend on the distribution of its subsidiaries in high-tax and low-tax countries.
These expectations are conﬁrmed by Figure 6.2. The Irish MNE is confronted with the
largest increase in the average tax rate if labour gets the unit weight in the apportionment
formula, while the Portuguese MNE is hardly affected, ex ante. However, the latter ﬁrm is able
to reduce its average tax rate by reallocating to low-tax and capital intensive countries if capital
gets a high weight. Similarly, the Irish ﬁrm is able to reduce its average tax rate, in particular
since reallocation to low-tax and labour intensive countries pays off.
Why are Irish ﬁrms able to beneﬁt (relatively) from an apportionment system with a large
share on labour, whereas the Portuguese ﬁrms beneﬁt from the formula with unit weight on
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a The average tax rates of MNEs are expressed in deviation of the statutory rate of their home country. The horizontal axis represent the
weighting scheme in the apportionment formula, with respectively one-third weights on employment, capital and production, unit weight
on employment, unit weight on capital and unit weight on production.
capital? The ﬁrst possible explanation is that the amount and direction of reallocation depends
on the weighting scheme. Figure 6.3 sheds light on this issue, by showing the change in
employment and capital by the headquarters in both countries with four alternative
apportionment formulae.35 Observe that the changes in employment and capital go hand in
hand, showing that a ﬁrm may expand employment only if its complementary input capital is
expanded to, and vice versa. The left panel of Figure 6.3 conﬁrms the ﬁrst explanation: the Irish
MNE expands its headquarter if employment gets a large weight in the apportionment formula.
However, if apportionment is based on capital shares only, then the Irish multinational shrinks,
because foreign MNEs want to expand. The alternative, though not mutually exclusive, reason is
that the impact of a ‘similar’ amount of reallocation on the average tax rate depends on the
apportionment formula. This effect clearly plays a role for the Portuguese multinational: its
reallocation hardly depends on the apportionment formula, but its impact on the average tax rate
(as shown in Figure 6.2) is much larger if the expansion in capital-intensive and low-tax
countries (like Ireland) or the reduction in Germany (capital intensive & high tax rate) are highly
weighted.
The other side of the picture is the tax revenue of governments. Consider ﬁrst the government
in the capital-intensive country Ireland. If capital gets a high weight in the apportionment
formula, then a large share of the consolidated tax base of all (including foreign) MNEs is
apportioned to Ireland.36 Moreover, foreign MNEs want to expand their capital stock (which
goes hand in hand with employment) in this low-tax country. This reduces the CIT-revenues, but
raises the revenues from the labour-income and consumption tax. The CIT-revenues shrink
because employment (and production) is shifted from domestic ﬁrms (whose CIT-base
35 The ﬁgure shows the impact for the parent of the MNEs in both countries. The reallocation by their subsidiaries tells the
same story.
36 See Figure 6.4 where the increase in tax revenues allows for a reduction of the labour tax rate.
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a The vertical axis shows the relative change in employment and the capital stock in the head quarters (i.e. the plants in the home
country) of the Irish and Portuguese multinationals. The horizontal axis represent the weighting scheme in the apportionment formula,
see Figure 6.2.
completely accrues to Ireland) and the Irish parent ﬁrms (of which a large part of the CIT-base
accrues to Ireland) towards foreign MNEs (of which only a small share of the CIT-base is
apportioned to Ireland). The competition for labour, however, drives Irish wages up (by 4%) and
allows for higher consumption (an expansion of 6%). The government in a capital-intensive
country thus beneﬁts from an apportionment formula with a large weight on capital. Similarly,
the government in a labour-intensive country (Portugal) beneﬁts from a large weight on labour,
which will be passed through towards the households via a reduction in the labour tax rate.
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a The ﬁgure shows the change in the labour tax rate, the relative change in GDP and the change in welfare for four alternative apportion-
ment formulae.
The change in the tax revenues and the implied change in the labour tax rate37 are key
determinants of the change in GDP and welfare. In all cases, welfare improves if the labour tax
rate decreases, and vice versa. The change in GDP reﬂects at least two other effects. First, the
change in GDP in ‘real’ prices Ireland is upward biased by abandoning of transfer prices, see
37 Qualitatively similar results hold for scenarios where the change in tax revenues are passed through to households in
an alternative way, e.g. a reduction in the tax on consumption goods or an increase in income transfers.
58footnote 33 on page 49. Second, the reallocation effect, which is of second order in the welfare
effects, negatively affects the ‘high-tax’-country (Portugal), as Figure 6.3 already implies.
Production in Ireland, however, becomes more attractive for MNEs as it increases the
apportioned share of the consolidated base in a low-tax country.
Summarising, the apportionment formula is important for the tax bill of multinationals. It
determines the amount and direction of reallocation, and also the ‘effectiveness’ of reallocation
in reducing the average tax rate. Reallocation has important implications for GDP, but less for
welfare. The latter depends more heavily on the change in the labour tax rate needed to
compensate the reduction or increase in tax revenues. Tax revenues in a capital intensive
country, like Ireland, increases if capital gets a large weight in the apportionment formula. This
allows for a reduction in the labour tax rate and improves welfare. Similarly, welfare in the
labour-intensive country, Portugal, improves if labour gets a high weight.
6.2 Formula apportionment in the European Union
With the lessons of the preceding section in mind, we extend the analysis to all EU member
states. We test the conclusions for both extreme situations (with unit weight on either capital or
labour), but also question why the production formula performs best in Figure 6.1.
6.2.1 Tax rate
How does the apportionment formula affect the average tax rate of MNEs? To answer this
question, we distinguish (like in section 5.1) between the institutional or ex ante part and the
endogenous or ex post part.
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a Countries with a tax rate below average are: IRL, HUN, POL, SWE, CZE, FIN, DNK and GBR. Countries with a relatively small tax
base are: GRC, ITA, PRT, SWE, ESP, AUT and FRA. Relatively capital extensive member states are: POL, PRT, CZE, HUN, GBR, GRC,
SWE, AUT and DNK. For each criterion, the other group consists of the missing member states.
59The institutionally determined change in the average tax rate is shown in Figure 6.5. The
message from this ﬁgure is that the ex ante change in the average tax rate of MNEs hardly
depends on the weights in the apportionment formula. Irrespective of the weights, MNEs in
low-tax countries face an increase in the tax rate, whereas MNEs in high-tax countries beneﬁt
from a reduction in the average tax rate (see left panel). For all four weighting schemes, MNEs
in capital-intensive countries pay lower taxes than the statutory rate in their home country. The
impact of alternative weights in the apportionment formula is to weaken or enforce the ex ante
change in the tax rate, without altering its sign.38
Why do MNEs in capital-intensive countries beneﬁt? Theoretically, there is little reason why
they beneﬁt more than MNEs in labour-intensive countries. For example, low-tax countries like
Ireland and Poland, will be confronted with a higher average tax rate, irrespective of the weights
in the apportionment formula. At least insofar the change in the tax rate is institutionally
determined (i.e. the ex ante part), the production structure of countries will not have a decisive
inﬂuence. Therefore, the main reason for the dichotomy in the right panel of Figure 6.5 is not the
interaction of the apportionment formula with the production structure of each country, but by
the simple fact that a few big capital-intensive countries, namely Germany and France, happen to
have high tax rates.
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a The ﬁgure shows the difference between the ex post and ex ante average tax rate for MNEs, depending on the statutory rate (left panel)
and capital intensity (right panel) of the home countries.
The production structure might inﬂuence, however, the response of MNEs to tax differentials.
Moreover, the impact of this reallocation on the average tax rate likely depends on the
apportionment formula: MNEs in capital-intensive countries likely beneﬁt from a high weight
on labour, and vice versa. The intuition is that MNEs can more easily change the production
levels of subsidiaries than of the parent, because changes in the large parent ﬁrms might affect
the wage rate in the home country which limits the return to reallocation.
38 We do not show the dependence of the average tax rate on the initial tax base. As expected, the interaction between
the apportionment formula and the initial broadness of the tax base is very weak, because the rules for the consolidated
tax base rules are the same for all MNEs.
60The right panel in Figure 6.6 conﬁrms both hypotheses: MNEs in capital-intensive countries are
more able to reduce their average tax rate via reallocation, in particular if employment gets a
high weight. The impact of reallocation does not, in the same uniform way, depend on the initial
tax rate. MNEs in low-tax countries beneﬁt most if apportionment depends on capital shares
only, but MNEs in high-tax countries beneﬁt most with the other three formulae.
6.2.2 Reallocation
Multinational enterprises are able to reduce their average tax rate by expanding production in low
tax countries. The change in the tax rate depends, however, on the weights in the apportionment
formula. Two reasons might explain this dependence. Either reallocation is stronger if either
capital or labour gets a disproportionately large weight or the impact of the same amount of
restructuring on the average tax rate differ (or both). In this paragraph, we investigate whether
size and direction of reallocation depends on the weights in the apportionment formula.
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a Change in employment of domestic ﬁrms (black), parents (grey) and subsidiaries (pale grey) as percentage of the labour force. See
Figure 6.5 for the classiﬁcation in labour- and capital intensive countries.
Figure 6.7 shows the reallocation of employment for the four different apportionment formulae.
It should be noted, however, that the reallocation of capital provides a similar picture, as labour
and capital are both needed in production, with only limited possibilities for substitution between
them. This close connection between both production inputs also explains the main result from
both ﬁgures: the amount and direction of reallocation hardly depends on the factor weights.
Quantitively much more important is the fact that reallocation is highest in labour-intensive
countries, where labour is relatively cheap. This conﬁrms the statement in the previous
paragraph that MNEs with capital-intensive parents beneﬁt most from reallocation, because their
subsidiaries in labour-intensive countries are expanded or shrinked. This general rule holds for
all weighting schemes, which only induces a bit more or a bit less reshufﬂing of employment. A
bit more, if either capital or employment gets a height weight. A bit less, if apportionment is
based on production shares.39
39 A split in countries between high-tax and low-tax countries (not shown) conﬁrm these conclusions. The change in
61Table 6.1 Decomposition of the change in tax revenues (%GDP)
Equal share Employment Capital Production
Corporate income − 0.12 − 0.13 − 0.11 − 0.11
Labour income 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03
Consumption 0.00 − 0.01 0.00 0.01
Personal capital income − 0.01 − 0.02 − 0.02 0.00
Total tax revenues − 0.10 − 0.14 − 0.13 − 0.08
The implication of the uniformity in reallocation patterns for the four weighting schemes implies
that the differentiated impact on GDP, as shown in Figure 6.1, cannot be explained from the
reallocation of MNEs only. The likely alternative explanation is that the weighting in the
apportionment formula has a strong impact on the tax revenues by government (the second side
of the coin), which will be passed through to households by a change in the labour tax rate. This
will be investigated in the next paragraph.
6.2.3 Government
Table 6.1 provides a decomposition of the change in tax revenues resulting from changes in the
tax bases. The consolidation of the corporate income tax, with the deduction allowances at the
current EU average, implies a reduction in CIT revenues. This is mainly the result of the tax
planning behaviour by MNEs, which are more able to plan taxes via the restructuring of
production than through transfer pricing. Part of the revenue loss is compensated by an increase
in the revenues of the labour income and consumption taxes, as the reallocation drives wages up
(by 0.15-0.20% on average). Finally, personal capital income reduces slightly.
The implied reduction in total tax revenues varies between the alternative apportionment
formulae. Apportionment on production shares implies the smallest reduction in tax revenues,
whereas apportionment on either employment or capital generates the largest loss of tax
revenues.
6.2.4 Economy and welfare
Section 5 has shown that the economic and welfare effects of common consolidated base
taxation (CCBT) depend on the initial tax rate and base if apportionment is introduced with
equal weights on labour, capital and production. Two questions are central in this section: does
the same hold for alternative weighting schemes and why?
employment and capital between domestic ﬁrms and multinationals is, for all four formulae, strongest in low-tax countries.
It is a bit more pronounced if capital or labour gets a high weight, and a bit tempered if apportionment is based on
production shares.
62Before we go to alternative weighting schemes, we ﬁrst present a decomposition of the
GDP-changes of formula apportionment with equal shares. We distinguish the following steps:
1. Elimination of existing distortions by the abolishment of transfer pricing and the reduction of
compliance costs
2. Harmonisation of the tax base for multinational enterprises at the EU-average
3. Consolidation of the tax base and the introduction of formula apportionment
Figure 6.8 shows how each step depends on the statutory tax rate and the tax base of each
member state.
Figure 6.8 Decomposition of GDP as function of the tax rate (left panel) and the tax base (right panel)a
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a The decomposition is given for CCBT with equal weight on employment, capital and production. The three steps are deﬁned in the
main text.
The elimination of transfer pricing harms GDP in countries with a net inﬂow of paper proﬁts,
which are the low-tax countries. For the EU on average, transfer pricing reduces the tax burden
for MNEs and thereby boosts production. Consequently, elimination of transfer pricing raises
the tax burden for MNEs and reduces GDP. This effect is counteracted, but only partly, by the
reduction in compliance costs.
The second step of tax base harmonisation clearly depends on the initial broadness of the tax
base: MNEs in member states with narrow bases cut down production because they are
confronted with an higher CIT burden.
The introduction of formula apportionment (the third step) again depends on the statutory tax
rates of member states: low tax countries beneﬁt from production expansion by MNEs. The
initial tax base plays a dominant role in the second step, such that member states with a broad
base will beneﬁt from harmonisation or consolidation. The statutory tax rates has conﬂicting
impacts in the three steps, resulting in a slightly positive GDP effect for low-tax countries.
Next, we return to the alternative weighting schemes. Only the third step, consolidation with
formula apportionment, depends on the factor weights. Figure 6.9 shows the impact for GDP for
two groupings of countries, with low/high tax rates and with labour/capital intensive countries.
63The grouping on tax bases is omitted, because the tax base only plays a role in the second step of
tax base harmonisation. The capital or labour intensity of countries is added, because section 6.1
has already pointed at its importance, in particular if an extreme weighting scheme (on either
employment or capital) is applied.40
Figure 6.9 Decomposition of GDP as function of the tax rate (left panel) and the labour- or capital intensitya
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a The three steps in decomposition of the change in GDP are given for CCBT with four alternative apportionment formulae. The ﬁrst and
second steps in the decomposition, cf Figure 6.8, do not depend on FA and are therefore given only once.
The left panel of Figure 6.9 reveals that a low initial tax leads to a GDP-gain under all four
formulae, but the effect is strongest if the most mobile production factor gets the highest weight.
Similarly, MNEs cut down their activity, leading to a reduction in GDP, in the high tax countries,
but this effect is hardly present if production is the only element in the apportionment formula.
The opportunities for MNEs to affect the formula with full weight on production are limited,
because they are not able to utilise the differences in capital intensity across countries, see Figure
6.7. The reason is that these differences in capital intensity are reﬂected both in the production
structure of member states and in the apportionment formula with unit weigth on production.
This point is conﬁrmed in the right panel, where the variation in GDP-effects are smallest with
the ‘production’ formula.
To close the circle, we return to Figure 6.1 for the welfare effects of alternative
apportionment formulae.41 The most favourable formula is where production shares determine
which fraction of the consolidated base is apportioned to each member state. We have shown
that the reason for this welfare gain is the limited possibilities for MNEs to use (or abuse) the tax
rate differentials between member states, which reduces the amount of tax-induced reallocation.
This is conﬁrmed in Figure 6.10, where the gap in welfare effects between low-tax and high-tax
member states is minimised with apportionment on production shares. In addition, because tax
40 The right panel of Figure 6.9 seems to suggest that the capital intensity also matters in the ﬁrst and second step. This
is merely a coincident, however. For example, Germany dominates the positive effect of capital intensive countries, not
because of its capital intensity, but because it beneﬁts a lot from narrowing its tax base.
41 See Table 6.2 for the effects on employment, GDP and welfare per member state.
64planning by MNEs is limited, the tax revenues on corporate income are larger than with the other
weighting schemes, such that a smaller increase in alternative tax revenues is needed.
Figure 6.10 Decomposition of welfare as function of the tax rate (left panel) and the labour- or capital intensitya
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a The three steps in decomposition of the change in welfare (%GDP) are given for CCBT with four alternative apportionment formulae.
The ﬁrst (the abolishment of transfer pricing and the reduction of compliance costs) and second step (harmonisation of the tax base) in
the decomposition do not depend on FA and are therefore given only once.
Welfare declines if either employment or capital gets unit weight in the apportionment formula,
as this gives ﬁrms the opportunity to intensively exploit the tax differentials between member
states. Tax planning is limited, however, if apportionment is based on payroll shares instead of
employment shares. The reason is that payroll shares closely reﬂect the economic structure of
MNEs: subsidiaries in capital-intensive countries tend to have a relatively low labour share,
which is compensated by a large compensation per employee.
Conclusion
This section has shown that the design of the apportionment formula matters, because the
differences in tax rates are still quite large in Europe. The better the formula resembles the
distribution of corporate income of MNEs, the more Europe gains from consolidation. The
uneven distribution of gains and losses can, however, not be resolved by a proper choice of the
apportionment formula. Low tax countries tend to gain from the introduction of a common
consolidated tax base, whereas high-tax countries lose, irrespective of the details of the
apportionment formula.
65Table 6.2 Changes in employment (L), production (Y) and welfare (W) under alternative factor weightinga
Equal share Employment Capital Production
L Y W L Y W L Y W L Y W
IRLb 0.71 − 0.60 0.59 0.04 − 1.18 − 0.36 2.06 0.84 3.35 0.28 − 1.14 0.02
HUN 0.39 0.13 0.35 0.47 0.04 0.53 0.70 0.40 0.58 0.12 0.00 0.08
POL 0.26 0.09 0.31 0.54 − 0.04 0.87 0.27 0.21 0.22 0.08 0.03 0.08
SWE 0.20 0.03 0.31 0.18 − 0.01 0.38 0.19 0.08 0.20 0.14 − 0.06 0.27
CZE 0.11 0.05 0.14 0.18 0.08 0.32 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.02 − 0.02 − 0.01
FIN 0.09 0.44 0.13 − 0.06 0.28 − 0.03 0.29 0.66 0.39 − 0.02 0.30 − 0.02
DNK 0.04 0.05 0.15 − 0.07 − 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.14 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.09
GBR 0.07 0.16 0.19 0.07 0.15 0.28 0.05 0.15 − 0.02 0.08 0.14 0.24
PRT 0.04 − 0.06 0.15 0.09 − 0.02 0.40 − 0.02 − 0.12 − 0.11 0.03 − 0.06 0.14
BLU 0.07 0.49 0.32 − 0.07 0.40 0.12 − 0.18 0.18 − 0.06 0.34 0.76 0.74
AUT − 0.03 − 0.11 0.00 − 0.09 − 0.14 − 0.05 − 0.11 − 0.20 − 0.11 0.04 − 0.05 0.10
NLD − 0.13 0.32 0.14 − 0.23 0.29 − 0.03 − 0.17 0.16 0.00 − 0.04 0.44 0.31
GRC− 0.14 − 0.72 − 0.40 − 0.13 − 0.71 − 0.38 − 0.15 − 0.73 − 0.42 − 0.14 − 0.72 − 0.41
ESP − 0.02 − 0.09 − 0.03 − 0.03 − 0.09 − 0.03 − 0.03 − 0.11 − 0.02 − 0.03 − 0.10 − 0.05
FRA − 0.21 − 0.22 − 0.15 − 0.36 − 0.33 − 0.34 − 0.21 − 0.26 − 0.10 − 0.14 − 0.14 − 0.08
ITA − 0.26 − 0.73 − 0.37 − 0.26 − 0.71 − 0.37 − 0.31 − 0.83 − 0.43 − 0.24 − 0.70 − 0.35
DEU− 0.07 0.74 0.04 − 0.08 0.82 0.00 − 0.22 0.46 − 0.05 0.01 0.86 0.08
EU − 0.02 0.05 0.01 − 0.03 0.03 − 0.01 − 0.05 − 0.02 − 0.03 − 0.01 0.08 0.03
a L and Y denote the relative change (%) in respectively total employment and GDP, W represents the change in welfare as percentage
of GDP.
b The countries are ranked at increasing tax rates.
667 Does consolidation trigger tax competition?
One might welcome tax competition as it may discipline governments, or one might fear it for
eroding the tax raising capacity of governments. With either of these opinions, one would like to
know whether tax competition is more likely with a consolidated tax base. The current section
tackles this issue by investigating the incentives for each member state to unilaterally reduce its
tax rate.
With the current system of separate accounting, Bettendorf et al. (2006) have concluded that
a tax-race to the bottom is unlikely: no country beneﬁts from abandoning the CIT-rate and not
even all countries beneﬁt from a tax-rate reduction. The main reason for this result is that the
loss of revenues from a reduction in the corporate tax rate has to be compensated by more
distortive taxes, like those on labour income or consumption.
The standard point of view in the economic literature is that formula apportionment increases
tax competition between jurisdictions, see section 2. On the one hand, consolidation of the tax
base eliminates the incentives for countries to underbid each others tax rates for proﬁt shifting
reasons. With formula apportionment, however, governments may attract multinational activity –
weighted in the formula – by underbidding each others tax rates. The standard view is correct if
the latter effect on location decisions dominates the incentives to attract paper proﬁts. In the
current section, we investigate whether consolidation triggers tax competition.
Pethig and Wagener (2003) conclude that tax competition is sharper the more elastically the
apportionment formula reacts upon tax changes. An indication of this came forward in the
previous section, where low-tax and low-wage countries beneﬁt from a employment-only
formula, whereas low-tax but capital-intensive countries beneﬁt from a one-third formula on
employment, capital and production. The second question of this section is therefore, whether
tax competition depends on the apportionment formula.
Both questions are investigated for the common consolidated base taxation (cf section 5). To
avoid overly strong incentives for tax rate reductions, we again assume that governments have to
balance their budgets with taxes on labour income. We discuss the simulation results in two
steps. We ﬁrst focus on a single country, Germany, and then extend the analysis to the other
member states.
7.1 An example: Germany
Consider ﬁrst a single country, Germany, with a high tax rate of 40% (in 2002). For separate
accounting, Bettendorf et al. (2006) have shown that Germany would beneﬁt from an unilateral
tax-rate reduction, in order to reduce outward proﬁt shifting by MNEs. This result is reproduced
in Figure 7.1, which shows the welfare gain for Germany of introducing a lower tax rate (in the
range of 10 to 40%), while keeping the tax rates of the other countries at the observed levels. In
this simulation, the optimal tax rate for Germany is 25%, much lower than the current rate.
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a The ﬁgure shows the welfare gain in Germany for setting unilaterally a lower tax rate (between 10 and 40%) in two scenarios: with
separate accounting and with CCBT with formula apportionment (1/3 weight on labour, capital and production).
Consolidation with formula apportionment increases the incentives for Germany to reduce the
CIT rate. First, the same reduction of 15 percentage points would pay off more (a welfare gain of
0.51%GDP instead of 0.44%GDP). In addition, a further reduction to a rate of 22% would
generate an additional gain of 0.02%GDP. This shows for Germany that the incentives to attract
paper proﬁts (or to avoid negative paper proﬁt shifting) under separate accounting are weaker
that the incentives to attract production by foreign MNEs under formula apportionment.
The welfare measure comprises the economic effects of tax competition for Germany. Not in
every respect, however, is tax rate reduction more favourable under formula apportionment than
with separate accounting. In terms of employment it is: the employment reduction (due to the
higher tax on labour) is limited to 0.4% instead of 0.5%. In terms of investment and GDP,
however, tax rate reduction under formula apportionment is less favourable: investment increases
less (5.3% instead of 6.0%) and the expansion of GDP is slighly limited (1.6% instead of 1.7%).
7.2 CCBT & tax competition
The ﬁnal bar in Figure 7.2 repeats the result for Germany: the optimal tax rates for Germany lie
well below the actual rate of 40%. This shows that Germany would gain from an unilateral
reduction in its CIT rate, both with separate accounting, but even more with formula
apportionment. Similar analysis for the other member states shows that tax competition is
intensiﬁed by consolidation with formula apportionment (with equal weights on employment,
68capital and production). The optimal ‘unilateral’ tax rate under formula apportionment (FA) is
lower than the corresponding rate under separate accounting (SA) for every country. The ﬁnding
that the optimal tax rate under SA is close to the current rate for many countries no longer holds
under the FA-system.
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a The ﬁgure shows the optimal tax rates for each member state, assuming that other countries do not adjust their rates, in two scenarios:
with separate accounting and with CCBT with formula apportionment (1/3 weight on labour, capital and production).
The differences between member states are large, however. At one extreme, Ireland would
beneﬁt from subsidising corporate income, in an attempt to attract foreign capital and to induce
reallocation of employment towards MNEs. The extreme position of Ireland is mainly due to its
openness. For other countries with a large share of multinationals (Belgium and the
Netherlands), the incentives to reduce the CIT rate under formula apportionment are strong, but
weaker than in Ireland.
Greece is at the other extreme: even with formula apportionment it has no incentive to
unilaterally reduce its tax rate. Moreover, the difference between the optimal tax rates in the
current system of separate accounting and in the proposed consolidation is small. Similar small
effects are observed in relatively closed economies like Germany, France and Spain, but not in
closed economies with low wage rates (Hungary and Poland) where reallocation is relatively
cheap.
Table 7.1 presents a slightly broader picture of the gains for individual countries to initiate
tax competition if other countries do not respond. Of course, all countries beneﬁt from the
unilateral change in the CIT rate, otherwise they would not change it in the ﬁrst place (like
69Greece). In addition, investment and GDP expand in all member states, which reﬂects the
increased attractiveness of each country for MNE activity. The picture for employment is mixed,
however. On the one hand, employment expands in response to the large labour demand by
MNEs. On the other hand, the necessary increase in the labour tax rate reduces employment.
Table 7.1 Economic effects of optimal unilateral reductions in CIT ratesa
CIT rate Labour tax Wage Employment Investment GDP
rate
Ireland − 12.5 1.1 2.6 0.3 2.5 1.3
Hungary − 12.7 1.5 2.3 − 0.1 3.1 0.6
Poland − 6.0 0.7 0.9 − 0.1 1.4 0.2
Sweden − 23.0 0.9 2.7 0.3 4.1 1.3
Czech Republic − 8.0 1.0 1.4 − 0.2 2.1 0.5
Finland − 13.0 1.3 2.3 − 0.1 3.5 1.1
Denmark − 25.0 2.1 3.2 − 0.2 5.0 1.5
United Kingdom − 15.0 1.4 1.7 − 0.2 3.7 0.9
Portugal − 13.0 0.9 0.9 − 0.2 2.0 0.3
Belgium − 29.0 0.2 4.3 1.1 6.3 2.7
Austria − 10.0 0.8 1.0 − 0.3 1.9 0.3
Netherlands − 29.5 2.1 4.4 0.0 7.4 2.4
Greece 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Spain − 7.0 0.8 0.9 − 0.2 1.4 0.3
France − 6.4 0.6 0.8 − 0.2 1.2 0.2
Italy − 5.3 0.3 0.3 − 0.2 0.1 0.0
Germany − 17.6 1.8 3.2 − 0.4 5.3 1.6
a The optimal CIT-rates are given in Figure 7.2. The change in both tax rate are expressed in percentage points; the others in percentages.
7.3 Formula apportionment and tax competition
Does the result that tax base consolidation with formula apportionment triggers competition in
tax rates also hold for other apportionment formulae? Does tax competition depend on the
mobility of production factors?
Figure 7.3 answers both questions afﬁrmatively. Tax competition is intensiﬁed by
consolidation with apportionment formula irrespective of the weighting scheme. The weighting
scheme does matter, however, resulting in ﬁercest competition if the internationally mobile
production factor, capital, gets a high weight. By reducing tax rates in this scenario, countries
are beneﬁtting from the largest response of multinationals and from the largest inﬂow of foreign
direct investment.42 This conﬁrms the theoretical prediction by Pethig and Wagener (2003)
42 One might wonder whether this contrasts the earlier ﬁndings, in section 6, where the unit weight on capital induces the
largest response by MNEs, but at the same time generates an average welfare loss. The crucial difference is that tax
competition is about unilateral tax rate reductions, which are valued at the welfare gain of individual member states only,
thereby ignoring the beggar-thy-neighbour nature of tax competition. In contrast, the introduction of formula
apportionment is an EU-wide policy valued in terms of the welfare in all member states.
70Figure 7.3 Tax competition with alternative formulaea
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a The ﬁgure shows the optimal unilateral (percentage points) reduction of the tax rates with CCBT, assuming that other countries do not
adjust their rates, with separate accounting and with formula apportionment with four alternative weighting schemes.
stating that ‘if labour input is ﬁxed, tax competition is sharpest if apportionment is based on
property shares’. The ﬁnal message from Figure 7.3 is that tax competition, measured as the
optimal unilateral reduction of the tax rate, is larger in open economies. Obviously, these
countries are able to beneﬁt most from the tax planning strategies of multinationals.
Conclusion
Consolidation enlarges the incentives for member states to reduce their tax rate. Member states
beneﬁt more from the real tax planning strategies of MNEs affecting the apportionment of the
tax base than from the existing proﬁt shifting via transfer pricing. This intensiﬁcation of tax
competion holds for all apportionment formulae, but is strongest if the internationally mobile
production factor, i.e. capital, gets full weight in the formula.
71728 Alternative proposals for consolidation
Various alternatives types of consolidation have been put forward by the European Commission
in its 2002 Tax Communication.43 It is worthwile to investigate some of these alternative
proposals for a couple of reasons. First, although the common base consolidation is put forward
in recent communications, like European Commission (2006), the alternatives have not been
dismissed altogether and might recieve renewed attention in the near future. Second,
investigation of the alternatives might shed new light on the particularities of the common
consolidated base taxation (CCBT). Third, the most far-reaching proposals, with consolidation
of the tax base and harmonisation of the tax rate, offers insight in the potential gains from
consolidation as it eliminates most tax distortions between member states.
This section discusses the economic and welfare effects of Home State Taxation (HST), of
compulsory consolidation for all ﬁrms and the far reaching proposal of the European Union
Corporate Income Tax (EUCIT), where even tax rates are harmonised.
8.1 Home state taxation
The consolidated tax base is calculated according to the rules of the home state. We assume that
all European multinationals change to the new system, but domestic ﬁrms stick to the tax rules
of their home country. Separate accounting still applies, however, for American ﬁrms and for the
European subsidiaries in the United States. Like in section 5, we assume that formula
apportionment is deﬁned with equal weights on employment, capital and production.
8.1.1 Firms
Home state taxation implies that the tax base of domestic ﬁrms and domestic MNEs are deﬁned
similarly, but MNEs from different home states are subject to different tax rules. This change in
the tax base likely has implications for the reallocation between ﬁrms. In comparison with
CCBT, the incentives to reallocate between domestic MNEs and domestic ﬁrms are reduced, but
the differences between domestic ﬁrms and foreign MNEs are increased. In comparison with the
current system of separate accounting (and this is what the subsequent analysis shows), the tax
base rules for ﬁrms are hardly changed: no single ﬁrm is confronted with a change in the
broadness of the tax base. The only change is the consolidation of the tax base, and the
subsequent introduction of formula apportionment. It is unlikely therefore that reallocation and
other economic effects depend on the initial tax base (like it did with CCBT, see Figure 5.3).
This is conﬁrmed by Figure 8.1 showing that reallocation depends on the initial tax rate, but
not on the initial tax base (reallocation is very limited in narrow-base countries like Greece and
43 See section 3 and more recently in communications on Home State Taxation, see European Commission (2004c,
2005).
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a Reallocation of employment (% labour force) with home state taxation and formula apportionment with one-third weights on employment,
capital and production. Countries are ranked with increasing tax rates.
Italy). In the terminology of section 5: the base harmonisation effect is absent with home state
taxation. The two other effects are still present, though, and mimic reallocation under CCBT.
The direct tax burden effect implies that MNEs want to reduce employment and investment in
subsidiaries for which the average tax rate increases, which are the countries with low statutory
rates (cf Figure 5.2). This implies a reduction of employment and capital by MNEs – both
parents and subsidiaries – in low-tax countries (like Ireland, Hungary and Poland) and an
increase of both production factors in high-tax countries like Germany and Italy.
The reallocation effect implies that ﬁrms want to beneﬁt from the opportunity to reduce the
tax burden by shifting labour, capital and production to low-tax countries. A larger share of these
factors in a low-tax country implies that a large share of the consolidated tax base is apportioned
to these low-tax countries. In particular subsidiaries in low-tax countries respond to the
opportunities for tax planning which the apportionment formula provides: subsidiaries in
Ireland, Hungary and Poland expand at the expense of domestic ﬁrms and MNE-headquarters.
However, in high-tax countries, MNEs respond by reducing investment and employment, which
offsets the expansionary direct tax burden effect.
The absence of the base harmonisation effect implies that the changes in the value of the ﬁrm
are tempered (cf Figure 5.4), though the variation between countries still exists. On average,
MNEs still gain from consolidation, but this gain reduces from 2.8% with CCBT to 1.6% with
HST. Similarly, domestic ﬁrms lose on average from consolidation, as they are confronted with
ﬁercer competition for domestic labour, but the average loss reduces from 4.0% with CCBT to
1.4% with HST.
748.1.2 Government
How does the change in the type of consolidation and the reduced incentive for reallocation
affect government revenues? Figure 8.2 shows a decomposition of tax revenues with either home
state taxation or common consolidated base taxation.


































10-20% 20-30% 30-40% EU (33%)
%GDP
a The ﬁgure decomposes the total tax revenues before compensation with the labour tax rate. The countries are split in three groups:
IRL, POL and HUN have tax rates below 20%, the tax rates of SWE, CZE, FIN, DNK and GBR fall between 20% and 30%, and the
remaining countries have tax rates above 30%.
The ﬁgure shows a clear difference of both proposals for the change in tax revenues on corporate
income. Without the harmonisation of the tax base for MNEs, which is inherent in CCBT,
CIT-revenues hardly change. This shows that the pure effect of consolidation on CIT revenues is
quite small.
This limited effect of home state taxation on CIT revenues also explains the smaller
reduction in total tax revenues in the EU. The labour-tax revenues partly counteract this effect,
however, as they slightly increases with the CCBT proposal, but decline with HST. This is due to
the smaller amount of reallocation with HST, which tempers the upward pressure on wages.
In both scenarios MNEs in low-tax countries want to expand their production, which results
in higher wage income, consumption and proﬁt income. This is reﬂected in higher tax revenues.
The opposite holds for high-tax countries, which face a reduction in the revenues of all four
kinds of taxes.
8.1.3 Economy and welfare
We have emphasised in this section that the initial tax base plays a minor role in the change from
separate accounting to home state taxation. Figure 8.3 conﬁrms this, by showing that the
distinction between gaining or losing member states depends only on the initial tax rate, but not
on the tax base. For example, one of the countries with the narrowest base, namely Greece,
beneﬁts from HST, whereas Italy loses.
The welfare gain in low-tax countries reﬂects the rise in net income of households, due to a
higher wage rate and a reduction in the labour tax rate, see Table 8.1. However, the welfare gain
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a The change in welfare (%GDP) is the result of the introduction of HST, with the one-third apportionment formula on employment, capital
and production, and where governments adjust the labour-tax rate to balance the budget. The countries are located at their statutory tax
rate and the rate of tax deductions.
does not need to go hand in hand with an expansion of production: the expansion of production
by MNEs goes at the expense of domestic ﬁrms, as has been shown in Figure 8.1. For many
low-tax member states, the net effect is a reduction in GDP and a smaller capital stock.
The EU on average hardly gains nor loses from home state taxation: welfare is unchanged
and GDP declines slightly. Consolidation and the induced reduction in compliance costs
generate a welfare gain, which is offset by the distortive effect of formula apportionment and the
unlevel playing ﬁeld for MNEs from different member states.
8.2 Compulsory consolidation
Neither CCTB nor HST will deliver the welfare which might be expected from consolidation. In
both cases, unevenness between ﬁrms and formula apportionment in combination with the large
tax-rate differentials are identiﬁed as the culprits. Both culprits will be removed in turn, where
we ﬁrst make the common system compulsary and in the next section we add the harmonisation
of the tax rates.
We harmonise the base of the tax on corporate income at the EU average of δEU
t = 7.2%.
Both domestic and multinational enterprises have to switch to this common tax base.44 Of
course, consolidation beneﬁts multinationals, but is meaningless for domestic ﬁrms. As before,
44 This harmonisation of the tax base leaving the tax rate country-speciﬁc is known as the compulsory harmonised
corporate tax base (CHCTB), see section 3.
76the consolidated tax base is apportioned to the member states with one-third shares on
employment, capital and production.
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a Change in employment (% labour force) by MNEs in each member state of both parents and subsidiaries, if CCTB is compulsory for all
ﬁrms or if only MNEs participate.
How important is the inclusion of domestic ﬁrms in the tax base harmonisation? Figure 8.4
shows that it is very important for the reallocation of production by ﬁrms. The ﬁgure compares
the amount of reallocation, measured as the change in employment of MNEs in each member
state, under CCTB for all ﬁrms and CCTB for MNEs only. In particular in countries with
extreme broad or narrow tax bases, like Germany and Greece, the incentive to reallocate within a
country reduces substantially.45 The remaining incentive to reallocate is the tax-rate differential,
as multinational enterprises reduce their tax obligations by expanding their subsidiaries in
low-tax countries.
How large are the efﬁciency gains if all countries harmonise their corporate income tax base
for both MNEs and domestic ﬁrms? Figure 8.5 answers this question by showing the welfare
change for the EU and the member states. Welfare in the EU improves on average by 0.10%
GDP if the common tax base applies to all ﬁrms. This shows that the design of consolidation is
crucial: consolidation will only be beneﬁcial if it does not introduce new distortions between
ﬁrms.
Despite the average welfare gain with the CCTB for all ﬁrms, the distribution of gains and
losses is very uneven. This is mainly due to the existing heterogeneity, in particular in the
45 Cnossen (2003) points at the domestic distortions being obstacles for European harmonisation or consolidation of the
corporate income tax.
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a The ﬁgure shows the change in welfare (as %GDP), if the CIT is harmonised for MNEs only (grey bars) or if the CIT is harmonised for
all ﬁrms (black bars).
broadness of the tax base. In general, member states beneﬁt from a narrowing of their base, but
lose if the common base is broader than their existing base. A noticable exception is Sweden,
where the additional CIT-revenues from a broader base can be used for a reduction in the highly
distortive tax on labour income.
8.3 European Union Corporate Income Tax
The most far-reaching proposal for consolidation is the harmonisation of not only the tax base
but also the tax rate. A proposal in this direction is the European Union Corporate Income Tax
(EUCIT).46 We investigate this proposal to show the potential welfare gain of consolidation, i.e.
if all tax distortions between countries are minimised. This gain is reached if the CIT base and
rate are harmonised for both MNEs and domestic ﬁrms.47
46 In this proposal, the corporate income tax revenues might become a direct ﬁnance source of the EU. As the EU is not
included as a separate entity in the model, tax revenues are distributed to the member states. The correlation between the
observed shares of the contribution of the considered member states (in 2002, see European Commission (2004b)) and
the simulated shares in the CIT revenues equals 0.98. Therefore, under the assumption that the new EU-revenues will
partially replace the existing contributions by the member states, our way of modeling these ﬂows does not affect the
outcomes.
47 We harmonise both the rate and the base of the tax on corporate income at the EU average of respectively
τEU
p = 33.3% and δEU
t = 7.2%, which holds for all European ﬁrms, both domestic and MNEs. As before, the consolidated
tax base is apportioned to the member states with one-third shares on employment, capital and production.
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a Change in employment (% labour force) by MNEs in each member state of both parents and subsidiaries, if only the CIT for MNEs is
harmonised or if CIT for all ﬁrms is harmonised.
How important is the harmonisation of the tax rate? Figure 8.6 shows that it is very important for
the reallocation of production by ﬁrms. Indeed, the common consolidated base and the
harmonised tax rate eliminate the tax-incentives for reallocation. Only small amounts of
reallocation can still be observed, like in Ireland, where the existing bias for MNEs to locate in
this low tax-country rate is eliminated.
Due to the limited incentives for reallocation, harmonisation of the tax rate generates an
additional welfare gain of about 0.04% GDP, as is shown in the right panel of Figure 8.7. The
left panel, showing the GDP-effects from consolidation and tax-rate harmonisation repeats the















a The ﬁgure shows the change in GDP (%) and welfare (as %GDP) for three assumptions on the common base: for MNEs only (CCTB),
for all ﬁrms (compulsory) and if the tax rates are harmonised too (EUCIT).
79message of this section: the beneﬁts from the common consolidated base can be fully obtained if
the common base applies compulsory for all ﬁrms and if in addition the tax rates are
harmonised.48
Conclusion
Comparing the alternative types of consolidation with ‘common consolidated base taxation’
points at the importance of the even or uneven treatment of ﬁrms within and between countries.
The strength of CCBT is that all MNEs are treated equally. Its weakness is, however, that
domestic ﬁrms might be excluded, and even MNEs might choose to stick to the current system
of separate accounting. This creates uneven competition between ﬁrms, and leads to a signiﬁcant
reduction of GDP, employment and welfare on average in the EU.
Additional gains can be obtained with the far-reaching EUCIT, where not only tax bases are
compulsory consolidated, but where in addition tax rates are harmonised.
Table 8.1 Economic and welfare effects of Home State Taxationa
Countryb CIT τl w L K GDP CV
(y) (a) (r) (r) (r) (r) (y)
Ireland − 0.21 − 0.60 1.21 0.73 − 0.67 − 0.88 0.49
Hungary 0.00 − 0.53 0.39 0.40 0.23 − 0.16 0.33
Poland 0.02 − 0.42 0.30 0.27 0.26 − 0.09 0.28
Sweden 0.04 − 0.17 0.07 − 0.04 − 0.45 − 0.23 0.30
Czech Republic 0.02 − 0.20 0.06 0.08 0.01 − 0.05 0.12
Finland − 0.08 0.04 0.21 0.15 0.46 0.25 − 0.05
Denmark − 0.01 0.01 0.08 − 0.04 − 0.05 − 0.07 0.11
United Kingdom 0.00 − 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.34 0.04 0.10
Portugal 0.05 − 0.23 − 0.01 0.02 − 0.08 − 0.01 0.19
Belgium & Luxembourg − 0.07 0.02 0.24 0.01 0.78 0.25 0.14
Austria 0.02 0.05 − 0.06 − 0.11 − 0.26 − 0.18 0.02
Netherlands − 0.03 0.10 0.01 − 0.05 0.46 0.13 − 0.04
Greece 0.01 0.00 − 0.05 − 0.04 − 0.15 − 0.07 0.01
Spain 0.00 0.03 − 0.01 − 0.03 − 0.02 − 0.03 0.00
France − 0.02 0.39 − 0.05 − 0.32 − 0.26 − 0.30 − 0.16
Italy 0.02 0.15 − 0.08 − 0.22 − 0.28 − 0.24 − 0.01
Germany − 0.04 0.16 0.02 − 0.02 0.64 0.25 − 0.12
EU − 0.01 0.03 0.04 − 0.02 0.11 − 0.04 0.00
USA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 − 0.01 0.00
a Formula apportionment is assumed to depend on employment, capital and output with equal weights.
b CIT: change in revenues from corporate income tax, as share of GDP (y); τl: absolute (a) change in labour-tax rate; w, L, K and GDP:
relative (r) change in respectively the wage rate, employment, capital and gross domestic production; CV: change in welfare, as fraction
of GDP.
48 This does not prove that harmonisation of the tax rate is the best policy. It only shows that harmonisation is better for
the EU than the current situation with large tax differentials, but it does not imply that alternative scenario’s with – likely –
small variation in tax rates might be better.
809 Conclusion
The economic effects of consolidating the corporate income tax base and applying formula
apportionment depend crucially on its design. The largest gains from consolidation might be
expected if all enterprises, both domestic and multinational, are treated equally. Proposals for
consolidation which exclude part of the ﬁrms may create an unlevel playing ﬁeld which induces
a large restructuring both within and between member states. Formula apportionment distorts
the investment and labour-demand behaviour of multinational enterprises, which are minimised
if the apportionment formula reﬂects the distribution of corporate income of MNEs.
The main beneﬁts from the abolishment of separate accounting by consolidating the tax base are
the elimination of paper proﬁt shifting, the introduction of automatic loss compensation for
cross-border activities and the reduction of compliance costs. However, consolidation has its
costs too, as it may create unequal opportunities for different ﬁrms. With common consolidated
base taxation (CCBT), domestic ﬁrms might face a different deﬁnition of the tax base than
MNEs. Consider the introduction of a common base at the EU average to which only
multinationals may apply. In countries with a broad tax base, this consolidation beneﬁts
multinationals relative to domestic ﬁrms, as the latter still have to apply to the broad domestic
rules.
In the alternative proposal of home state taxation, where ﬁrms have to make their tax
declaration according to the rules of their home country, domestic ﬁrms and multinational
headquarters are treated equally. Unevenness is now introduced, however, between subsidiaries
of foreign MNEs. Home state taxation gives preferential treatment to subsidiaries originating
from member states with a narrow tax base.
The full beneﬁts from consolidation can only be reaped if all ﬁrms participate and apply to a
common tax base. If domestic ﬁrms are excluded, the EU-average gains in terms of GDP and
welfare from CCBT equal respectively 0.08% and 0.03%GDP in the long run, with the most
favourable apportionment formula. The gains would be much larger, with additional gains for
both GDP and welfare of about 0.10%, if not only MNEs but all ﬁrms participate.
Apportioning the consolidated base to the member states leave them the autonomy to tax
corporate income at their own desired rate. However, the way in which the tax base is distributed
distorts the investment and production decisions of multinational enterprises. The largest
distortions are introduced if apportionment is based on a single production factor, e.g. on
employment or on capital. The incentives for reallocating production are minimised if the
apportionment formula resembles the distribution of the corporate income of MNEs. In the
simulations with CORTAX this is achieved if apportionment depends only on production shares.
81The economic effects of CCBT with formula apportionment are unevenly distributed, both
between and within countries. With separate accounting, low tax countries are attractive for the
location of paper proﬁts. With formula apportionment, however, low tax countries are attractive
for the location of production (and production factors): higher production in low-tax countries
enlarges the apportioned share of the tax base in these jurisdictions and thus reduces the average
tax payments of MNEs. This expansion of MNEs implies an increase in GDP, employment and
capital in low-tax countries. In contrast, production in high-tax countries declines. This uneven
distribution of gains and losses due to formula apportionment adds up to the unbalanced impact
of the common consolidated base. In our basic simulation of CCBT, where apportionment is
based on employment, capital and production in equal proportions, the change in welfare ranges
between a reduction of 0.4%GDP and an increase of 0.6%GDP, whereas the change in GDP
ranges between a reduction and an increase of both 0.7%.
Finally, tax competition is intensiﬁed with common consolidated base taxation. Relatively open
economies and those with low tax rates have stronger incentives to reduce their tax rate with a
consolidated tax base than with separate accounting. Would formula apportionment be based on
an internationally mobile production factor, like capital, tax competition might even result in a
race to the bottom: for several member states it is optimal to leave their proportioned share of the
common tax base untaxed. Would apportionment be based on an internationally less mobile
factor, like employment, tax rates are likely to be cut, but not to the bottom.
In sum, the advantages of replacing separate accounting by consolidation turn out to be small for
the EU as a whole, according to our simulations. The favourable effects of reducing existing
distortions are offset by the introduction of new distortions.
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